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1 Introduction
What determines a countrys political institutions, and in particular, the extent to
which they are democratic?1 An important set of explanations has focused on the
idea that conict, or the possibility of conict, induces leaders to promote institutional
change. Tilly (1990), Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) and Dincecco and Prado (2012)
argue that conict, and in particular wars between countries, created the setting for
Western European nations to build institutions that would enable the enforcement of
contracts and collection of taxes. Conict also plays an important role in Acemoglu
and Robinsons (2000, 2001, 2006) theory of democratization; they emphasize how the
threat of conict, in the form of a revolution, induces autocrats to make democratic
concessions in an attempt to defuse that threat. In their theory revolutions are more
likely in times of economic hardship, so negative economic shocks open a window of
opportunitythat can lead to a peaceful transition towards democracy.
In this paper we test the hypothesis that low-intensity conict (riots) leads to
democratic reform, and that this often happens through concessions made in response
to the riots. The events in Togo in 1991 illustrate this mechanism. As Piot (2010)
explains, [i]n Togo in summer 1991, after months of clashes on the streets between
dissidents and the military, Eyadéma capitulated to calls for a national conference to
discuss steps toward democratization(p.31). Meredith (2005) concurs that the riots
put pressure on president Eyadéma: [a]fter months of strikes, demonstrations and
violence, Eyadéma agreed in April 1991 to allow opposition parties to operate and
in July yielded to demands for a national conference(p.397). The concessions were
partial, however: [a]t the end of the national conference in 1991, Eyadéma cleverly
headed o¤ an attempt by the political opposition to strip him of power ... but agreed
to hold presidential elections (Piot, p.33). Fearing electoral fraud, the opposition
boycotted the election and allowed Eyadéma to win with 96 percent of the vote (Piot,
33).
The main di¢ culty in testing whether conict opens a window of opportunityis
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that riots are rarely exogenous: there might be problems of reverse causality because
the expectation of political change might itself lead to riots, and there might be unob-
servable omitted variables that cause both riots and political change. We address these
technical problems by using droughts to create an instrumental variable for riots, as
there is a considerable amount of case study evidence that shows that droughts often
trigger social unrest in poor countries (see, for example, Walton and Seddon (1994)).2
To test the hypothesis that riots lead to democratic change we focus on sub-Saharan
Africa in the period between 1990 and 2007. This choice is motivated by the large
number of democratic (and anti-democratic) transitions that took place in that part of
world during the sample period, and by the fact that drought is a particularly relevant
instrument for this subset of countries.3 We use data on democratic change from the
Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005) and geographical data on riots from
the Social Conict in Africa Database (Hendrix and Salehyan, 2011).
Our instrumental variables estimates show a strong rst stage relationship between
drought and riots, and represent empirical evidence that droughts lead to an increase
in riots. We then nd a signicant second stage relationship between (instrumented)
riots and democratic change. The magnitude of the e¤ect is substantial; for exam-
ple, some of our estimates suggest that the probability of a democratic change in the
average country in the sample increases by 16.7 percentage points (from a baseline
probability of 5.7%) as a consequence of the impact a drought has on riots. Naturally,
nding that riots lead to changes in democracy does not show that this is because
governments feel threatened and make concessions, as suggested by the theory and the
events in Togo discussed above. To address this concern, we restrict our attention to
instances of democratic change that can be explicitly associated with concessions made
by the incumbent government.4 This provides strong evidence that riots can lead to
democratic change because incumbent governments are induced to make democratic
concessions. This channel is di¤erent from that emphasized in the previous literature
(e.g. Burke and Leigh, 2010; Brückner and Ciccone, 2011), where democratic change
happens when its opportunity cost is low, as measured by GDP per capita.
3
These results provide new evidence that low-intensity conict can lead to democratic
change over relatively short periods of time. These results are consistent with the
causal mechanism underlying Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000, 2001, 2006) theory of
political transitions, where the threat of a revolution induces autocratic rulers to make
democratic concessions. Rioting and popular protest represent a threat to autocratic
rulers, and may signal that the democratic window of opportunity is open. This
might be because riots could unintentionally degenerate into a regime challenge (e.g.,
if rioters storm the presidential palace), or because the political opposition might use
them for this purpose (e.g. to try to start a revolution). In either case, the incumbent
government might react to this increased threat by making democratic concessions.
Our paper is related to a large literature that examines the relationship between
international conict and institutions. Tilly (1990), Ho¤man and Rosenthal (1997) and
OBrien (2011) argue thatWestern European institutions for tax collection were created
as a result of the need to pay for the costs of war. More recently, Besley and Persson
(2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) have developed a theory of institutional development where
conict plays a central role. Dincecco, Federico and Vindigni (2011) and Dincecco and
Prado (2012) provide empirical support for the link between conict, scal capacity
and institutional change. Our paper contributes to this literature, but di¤ers in that
it focuses on Africa (while most of the literature focuses on Western Europe), looks at
a more recent historical period, examines the short-term rather than long-term impact
of conict on institutional change, and emphasizes the role of the threat of internal
conict instead of the threat of international wars.
This paper also relates to a small but growing empirical literature on the threat of
revolution and democratization. Przeworski (2009) uses data on riots, demonstrations
and strikes to study the correlation between franchise extensions and the threat of rev-
olution in a broad world sample starting in 1918. Aidt and Jensen (2011) take a longer
historical perspective and use the international di¤usion of information about revolu-
tionary events in Europe between 1820 and 1938 to study the causal link between revo-
lutionary threats and su¤rage reform. Both studies nd evidence supporting Acemoglu
4
and Robinsons (2000) theory of democratization. None of these papers, however, ex-
plore the association between temporary economic shocks, riots, and democratization.5
Burke and Leigh (2010) use information about anti-government protests reported in
the New York Times to study the link between riots and democratic change in a world
sample of countries, but cannot properly identify the e¤ect. Using more detailed riots
data for Africa and an instrumental variables approach, we can identify the causal
impact riots have on democratic change.
Finally, our paper is also related to the large literature on adverse economic condi-
tions and political change (e.g. Burke and Leigh, 2010; Brückner and Ciccone, 2011),
and on economic shocks and civil conict (e.g. Collier and Hoe­ er, 1998, 2004; Miguel,
Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Jensen and Gleditsch, 2009; Brückner and Ciccone,
2010). Brückner and Ciccone (2011) and Burke and Leigh (2010) use rainfall shocks
to identify when and where the democratic window of opportunitymight be open.
Brückner and Ciccone (2011) establish a causal link between negative rainfall shocks
and democratic change in sub-Saharan Africa, suggesting that this happens because
rainfall shocks reduce real GDP per capita, which in turn reduces the opportunity cost
of contesting power; Barron, Miguel and Satyanath (2013) discuss the robustness of
these results. Burke and Leigh (2010) study a broader sample of countries and nd
results similar to those in Brückner and Ciccone (2011).6 Miguel, Satyanath and Ser-
genti (2004) use rainfall as an instrument for economic growth to establish a causal
link between (the lack of) economic growth and civil conict.7
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
framework. Section 3 presents the data, while section 4 lays out our empirical strategy.
Section 5 presents and discusses our main results, and section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The idea that the threat of social conict is linked in a causal way to democratic
change has a long history in political economy, and has recently gained renewed cur-
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rency through the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2006) and Boix (2003).
The formalization of this idea in the work by Acemoglu and Robinson emphasizes the
notion of a window of opportunityfor democratic reform. Their theory starts from
the premise that incumbent rulers are unwilling to share power with other groups be-
cause this compromises their policy objectives. Consequently, democratic reform only
happens in situations where opposition groups pose a threat to the status quo that
is seen as credible by the incumbents. In some cases the incumbents perceive a need
to act preemptively in order to avoid radical political change. Sharing power through
democratic reform is, of course, only one alternative amongst many open to the incum-
bents. Repression or policy concessions are often su¢ cient and typically preferable,
but sometimes more durable institutional change is required as the lesser of multiple
evils. A key element in this theory is that institutional reforms are durable, so that
they cannot be easily reversed once the threat that triggered them has subsided. His-
tory contains numerous instances in which reforms were undertaken under threat but
were subsequently rolled back; the Arab Springis perhaps the most recent example.
These instances do not undermine the logic of the theory; what matters is that at the
time they were made, the concessions were considered of su¢ cient duration to dissuade
opposition groups from overthrowing the regime. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) de-
velop this logic in a formal model where democratic concessions can be reversed; in
practice what makes democratic change more durable than other types of concessions
is that it involves a change in institutions. This does not make it impossible to revert
to the ex-ante status quo, but it does increase the cost of doing so.
An important insight that follows from this theory is that the threat posed by op-
position groups is not always credible, but when it is, a window of opportunity is
open. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Burke and Leigh (2010), and Brückner and
Ciccone (2011) associate the window of opportunitywith temporary adverse eco-
nomic shocks that lower the cost of contesting power, allowing opposition groups to
credibly threaten to overthrow the incumbents. We build on this idea but add an
important new dimension that is at the center of our empirical analysis. Acemoglu
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and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2006) assume that whether the window of opportunityis
open is common knowledge to all parties. This assumption is challenged in the work by
Andrews and Jackson (2005), among others, who point out that institutional reform
typically takes place under conditions of extreme uncertainty. In essence this means
that nobody can be entirely certain that the window of opportunityis open, and at
any given point in time incumbents and opposition groups must act taking cues from
events as they unfold. This insight, on the one hand, allows us to conjecture a link
between these cues and democratic change: we argue that riots which have not yet
escalated into a full-blown regime challenge but which have the potential do so are
important cues that may induce democratic concessions.8 On the other hand, allowing
for uncertainty introduces the new and important possibility that riots may develop
into full-blown revolutions or civil wars; this may happen, for example, if incumbents
underestimate the threat and fail to act in time to avoid it.9
We argue that riots, although often triggered by adverse economic shocks (e.g.
droughts), can a¤ect regime transitions through channels other than the opportunity
cost mechanism stressed in the previous literature (and captured by uctuations in
o¢ cial GDP per capita data). For example, in poor countries with large informal
sectors where a large fraction of the population lives near the subsistence level in the
countryside, negative weather shocks can lead to large population movements that
might trigger riots and induce democratic concessions.
In short, we can summarize our theory as follows: incumbents will only share power
if they perceive that opposition groups pose a credible threat. They use cues from un-
folding events to assess whether they need to act in order to preserve their power. One
important cue is low-intensity social unrest (e.g. riots) triggered by droughts. Based
on this logic, we hypothesize that riots induced by drought may result in democratic
concessions even if GDP per capita stays constant. We interpret this as a more re-
ned version of the window of opportunitytheory of democratic change than the one
tested elsewhere in the literature.
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3 Data
Our dataset combines information on democratic change, riots, droughts, and economic
conditions for a sample of 41 sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1990 to
2007.10 As many previous studies, we draw on the Polity IV database to measure
changes in democracy (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).11 We use this database to con-
struct three di¤erent measures of democratic change. The starting point for our rst
two measures is the variable regtrans. This variable indicates whether a regime tran-
sition has begun in a given year; it can take a number of di¤erent values, with the
value repeated in every year of the transition. Following Burke and Leigh (2010), we
only count transitions in the rst year in which they occur, setting the regtrans values
to zero in the later years. We then transform this adjusted version of regtrans into
a binary variable that equals one if any change (pro- or anti-democratic) started in
a given year, and zero otherwise. We call this new variable transition, binary. This
variable tells us whether a transition has started and allows us to test whether riots
have a short-run impact on democratic change, but gives us no information about the
direction or magnitude of the change.12 We address this limitation by using a count
version of transition, binary which we call transition, count. It takes values in the set {-
2,-1,0,1,2,3} as coded in the Polity IV database. Positive values denote pro-democratic
changes (i.e. towards a higher Polity IV index score) of di¤erent magnitudes, while
negative values denote anti-democratic changes; zero denotes no change. We also use
detailed case study evidence we collected on the 43 regime transitions recorded by the
Polity IV database as having taken place in sub-Saharan Africa during our sample
period. We use this information to identify those cases in which concessions by the
incumbent government played a role in the transition (so that it was not simply the re-
sult of a coup or an election), which allows us to restrict our regressions to these cases
only. This information was collected primarily from the Encyclopaedia Britannica,
supplemented with information from other sources.13
Naturally, these measures involve a loss of information, both because they do not
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capture the transition period in full (as they look only at the rst year of a transition),
and because the magnitude of the change is not captured accurately. To account for
this, we use the polity2 variable from the Polity IV database, which is a version of
the Polity IV index that has been corrected to allow for use in time series analysis.
However, periods of interregnum are coded as zero, which would lead us to mistakenly
interpret instances in which a country with a negative polity2 score falls into interreg-
num (and so its polity2 score increases to 0) as democratic improvements. We avoid
this problem by following Brückner and Ciccone (2011) and setting polity2 equal to
missing in all interregnum years and years immediately following an interregnum.
The data on riots is from the Social Conict in Africa Database version 2.0, up-
dated on July 12, 2011 (Hendrix and Idean, 2011). This is a comprehensive database
of protests, riots, strikes and other social disturbances in Africa from 1990 to 2010,
and it is constructed from Lexis-Nexis searches.14 The riots data include geographic
coordinates, which we use to construct Map 1.15 We include all riots, regardless of
whether they eventually led to a civil war.16 We create the variable riots to capture
the intensity of the protests; it is calculated by adding the duration (in days) of all
riots that happened in a given year and in a given country. Di¤erent riots are counted
individually even if they occurred on the same day. This coding has the advantage
that both riots that last more days and days with more riots contribute more to the
total.17
[Map 1: Riots in Africa, 1990-2007]
We use rainfall data from the Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP)
to identify countries and years with droughts between 1990 and 2007.18 We say that
a country experienced a drought in a given year if its annual rainfall level was below
the 20th percentile. We create a binary variable drought that equals one in country-
years where rainfall fell below this threshold, and zero otherwise.19 This is our main
instrumental variable for riots.
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Our measure of growth in per capita income, which we refer to as gdp per capita
growth, is calculated using data on GDP per capita from the World Development
Indicators (2011). Deaton and Miller (1995) and Deaton (1999) show that decreases
in commodity prices lead to slower (or negative) GDP growth in Africa. Brückner
and Ciccone (2010) use monthly commodity price data for 19 commodities to calculate
an annual price, and then use information in Deaton (1999) and the UN Commodity
Trade Statistics Database to construct a commodity exports basket for each country.
This then allows them to construct a country-specic index.20 We follow them and
use a growth version of this index, which we call commodity price index growth, as an
instrument for gdp per capita growth in some of our specications.2122
Figure 1 presents preliminary evidence of the relationship between riots and demo-
cratic change. Year 0 is dened as the year in which a transition begins (as recorded
by transition, binary) and the axis to the left (right) of that point measures the time
before (after) the start of the transition. The y-axis records the average across coun-
tries of the log of riots in that year. The graph clearly shows that riots increase in
the run-up to a transition, and that once a transition has begun the average number
of riots declines considerably.
[Figure 1: Pre- and post-transition riot activity]
4 Empirical Specication
Our main empirical specication is:
transitioni;t = + ln(riots)i;t 1+ ln(gdp per capita growth)i;t 1+i+t+ui;t; (1)
where transitioni;t is one of the three measures of democratic change introduced above.
We lag riots and gdp per capita growth by one year because it is unlikely that their e¤ect
on democratic change is immediate.23 We include country (i) and year (t) e¤ects, and
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we also include a lagged dependent variable in the specications with polity2 as the
dependent variable. This partial adjustment model allows us to estimate the short-run
and long-run impact of riots on democratic change in a more exible way.24
We include gdp per capita growth in our regressions for three reasons. First, it is
likely that uctuations in recorded national income capture changes in the opportunity
cost of a regime challenge, and so they might directly lead to preemptive democratiza-
tion. This is the idea behind the specications used by Brückner and Ciccone (2011).
Second, including gdp per capita growth is necessary for drought to satisfy the exclusion
restriction as an instrumental variable for riots. If riots remains statistically signi-
cant in specications that hold gdp per capita growth constant, then riots caused by
drought a¤ect democratic change through channels other than gdp per capita growth
(e.g. through shocks to the informal sector, migration, etc.). Finally, including gdp per
capita growth allows us to rule out that shocks lead to democratic change because they
limit an autocrats ability to use public funds to buy o¤opposition groups (Haggard
and Kaufman, 1997), or because they create opportunities for peaceful constitutional
exchange unrelated to the threat of conict (Congleton, 2007, 2011).
The main problem associated with the estimation of equation (1) is that riots and
gdp per capita growth are likely to be endogenous, as a large number of factors, some of
them unobservable, might impact on these variables and democratic change. To be able
to make a causal claim we must instrument for riots and gdp per capita growth, and we
do so by using drought and commodity price index growth as instruments. For drought
to be a relevant instrument it needs to be strongly correlated with riots, and we later
show that this is the case. To be valid, it must satisfy the independence condition and
the exclusion restriction. The independence condition requires that the treatment
assignment not be determined by the outcome. In our case, whether there is a drought
cannot be a function of whether institutional change is about to take place (or not).
Since drought (and rain more generally) is not determined by human activities or
decisions, at least in the short-run, this condition is satised. The exclusion restriction
requires that the instrument not belong in the structural equation (1). Specically, this
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means that drought should not a¤ect democratic change through channels other than
riots once we have controlled for country xed e¤ects, time e¤ects, and gdp per capita
growth. Analogously, for commodity price index growth to satisfy the independence
condition it must be that political change does not trigger changes in this index; in
other words, that it does not a¤ect the growth of international commodity prices. This
is true since the countries in our dataset are small players in international markets. The
exclusion restriction requires that commodity price index growth only a¤ects democratic
change through its impact on gdp per capita growth (once we control for riots), which
seems likely to be the case for small commodity exporters.
5 Main Empirical Results
We present our results in four tables. Table 1 shows OLS and conditional logit estimates
of the structural equation (1), as well as estimates of the reduced form where we
associate the instrument directly with our measures of democratic change. Table 2
shows the main results from the instrumental variables estimation. Table 3 presents the
results when we only consider transitions that involved concessions. Table 4 presents
the results for a dynamic panel specication.
5.1 Benchmark Estimates
As a benchmark, section A of Table 1 reports OLS and conditional logit estimates of
the structural equation (1). The outcome variable in column 1 is transition, binary, and
we nd that a one standard deviation increase in the log of riots leads to an increase in
transition, binary of 0.024.25 The mean value of this variable across countries and time
is 0.057, so this is a substantial e¤ect. In column 2, the outcome variable is transition,
count, which makes a distinction between transitions to and away from democracy.
The results are similar, and we conclude that riots are positively correlated with the
likelihood of short-run democratic change. Column 3 shows a specication with polity2
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in levels and a lagged dependent variable; the coe¢ cient estimate on riots is positive but
not signicant.26 Finally, column 4 shows the results from a xed e¤ects conditional
logit estimation with transition, binary as the outcome variable. The coe¢ cient on
riots is positive but not signicant.27 All these correlations are consistent with the
hypothesis that riots trigger democratic change.28
[Table 1: Structural and Reduced Form Regressions]
5.2 Reduced Form Estimates
As we noted above, endogeneity is a serious concern, and so the OLS (and logit)
estimates cannot be given a causal interpretation. Before we report the instrumental
variables estimates we present evidence on the reduced form, where we regress the
measures of democratic change directly on drought.29 This gives us an indication of
whether the causal relationship we have hypothesized is present. Column 1 in section B
of Table 1 reports on the specication with transition, binary as the outcome variable
and we nd a positive and signicant relationship with drought. Column 2 shows that
drought is also signicant in the regression using transition, count as the measure of
democratic change. Column 3 reports the results for the partial adjustment model with
polity2 ; drought is not signicantly correlated with polity2, but the sign is as expected.
5.3 IV Estimates
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 we present results where we instrument for riots using
drought. In section B of the table we report the rst stage results where we regress riots
on drought. In both columns drought at time t   2 has a signicant impact on riots
at time t  1. Section A of the table presents the second stage results using the 2SLS
estimator. The outcome variables are transition, binary and transition, count (the
results for polity2 are shown in Table 4). Since the F-statistics are below 10, we use
weak-instrument robust inference p-values (in square brackets) to assess signicance.
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The point estimate on riots is positive and statistically signicant in both columns 1
and 2. Taking the point estimates from column 1, a drought leads to an increase of
0:380 in the log of riots, while a one unit increase in the log of riots leads to an increase
of 0:440 in the probability of a transition. It then follows that a drought leads to an
increase of 0:440  0:380 = 0:167, or 16:7 percentage points, in the probability of a
transition. Since the average transition, binary value is 0:057, this is a considerable
increase. The outcome variable in column 2 is transition, count, and again we nd a
positive and signicant e¤ect of riots on democratic change. The estimated coe¢ cients
are large, but this is not due to the relative weakness of the drought instrument; since
the specications are just-identied, the 2SLS estimate is median-unbiased (see Angrist
and Pischke, 2009, p. 213).
[Table 2: 2SLS, Riots and Democratic Change]
It is plausible that the impact of riots on democratic change is heterogeneous across
countries. In this case, the instrumental variable estimate corresponds to an average
causal response, and should be interpreted as the impact on democratic change of riots
that happen because a country has switched into a state of drought. In other words,
the coe¢ cient on riots captures the average democratic change that follows from riots
that were triggered by drought. For example, the estimate in column 1 tells us that a
drought at time t  2 increases the log of riots at time t  1 by 0:380, so that there is
an increase of 16.7 percentage points in the probability of democratic change.
The average causal response is often uninformative because it is instrument-specic
and captures only the impact on compliers whose treatment status changes as a
result of a change in the instrument (Heckman, 1997). In our case, however, the
average causal response allows us to establish that the democratic change we observe
is a consequence of the increase in riots that resulted from a drought. This proves
particularly useful because it isolates the impact that comes from a change in drought
status, allowing us to show that a specic shock, drought, can lead to an improvement
in democracy because it increases the threat of social conict, as captured by riots.
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For our interpretation of the estimated IV coe¢ cients as average causal responses to
be valid, the monotonicity condition must hold (see Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist
and Imbens, 1995). This condition states that the impact of drought on the intensity
of riots must always be in the same direction, i.e. riots cannot become less intense
because there is a drought (relative to the counterfactual intensity of riots in the case
of no drought). In essence, we need to rule out the possibility that droughts inhibit
riots. This assumption cannot be tested, but we view it as being fairly uncontroversial.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 we present IV results using drought and the commodi-
ties price index growth as instruments for riots and gdp per capita growth. Section B of
the table shows the rst stage for riots, while Section C shows the rst stage for gdp per
capita growth. Section A presents the second stage results using the 2SLS estimator.
The F-statistics are again below 10, and so we use weak-instrument robust inference
p-values (in square brackets) to assess signicance. Looking at the top row in column 3,
we observe that the point estimate on riots in the specication with transition, binary
is positive and statistically signicant (according to two of the three p-values). The
outcome variable in column 4 is transition, count, and again we nd a large positive
e¤ect of riots on democratic change, although it is no longer signicant.
In Table 3 we repeat the regressions from Table 2 but we set transition, binary and
transition, count to 0 in instances where the transition did not involve concessions by
the incumbent. In short, transitions triggered by coups/revolutions or elections are
not recorded as democratic changes in these specications. If the results in Table 2
had been driven by transitions that were due to coups/revolutions or elections, then
these results would not show up in Table 3. However, the results are very similar
to those in Table 2; if anything, those in Table 3 are stronger. This shows that our
results are indeed consistent with the window of opportunityhypothesis: riots lead
to democractic change because they induce democratic concessions by the incumbent
government.30
[Table 3: 2SLS, Riots and Democratic Change, Concessions Only]
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5.4 The Partial Adjustment Model
Table 4 reports the results for the partial adjustment specication with polity2 as the
dependent variable. We include a lagged dependent variable, which introduces what
is known as the Nickell bias (see Nickell, 1981). We address this problem by using the
Arellano-Bond GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991).31 Column 1 reports the
results from a specication where we use drought and lagged right-hand side variables
as instruments for the di¤erenced equation. We nd the coe¢ cient on riots not to be
signicant.32 In column 2 we repeat these regressions but treat gdp per capita growth as
endogenous and include the commodity price index growth as an additional instrument
in the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure. The coe¢ cient on riots is signicant at
the 10% level.
[Table 4: Dynamic Specication with Polity2]
The Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is intended for cases in which n (i.e. countries)
is large and t (i.e. years) is small. However, our panel has at most 41 countries and 18
years, so that the Arellano-Bond estimates could be severely biased. An alternative is
to use the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator (see Bruno,
2005), which performs better than the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator when the num-
ber of cross-sectional units is small. The LSDV results are presented in column 3. The
point estimate is somewhat smaller than with Arellano-Bond, and signicant at the
10 percent level. Focusing on the point estimate obtained with the LSDV estimator,
a one standard deviation increase in the log of riots leads to a short-run increase of
1:744 0:131 = 0:229 points in the polity2 score, while the long-run impact is consid-
erably larger and equal to 1:16 points.33
5.5 Discussion of the Results
Taken together, our results suggest that riots trigger democratic change, providing
new evidence for the causal mechanism that underlies Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000,
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2001, 2006) theory of political transitions: adverse economic shocks generate social un-
rest and riots, which in turn lead incumbent governments to make democratic conces-
sions. Moreover, the size of the e¤ect is large and of economic and political importance.
Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000, 2001, 2006) theory of political transitions acknowl-
edges that incumbents might use strategies other than concessions to avoid being over-
thrown.34 For example, they may invest in repression or o¤er temporary transfers to
those who pose a threat to their rule, thus eliminating their incentive to participate in
a revolt.35 In our setting, food subsidies could be used to mitigate the incentive to riot
in the face of a drought, while international food aid could unintentionally serve the
same function. It is not possible for us to control for these alternative strategies, and
so they remain as potential sources of statistical bias in the estimation of  in equation
(1). To establish the direction of this bias, let us consider the consequences of omit-
ting spending on repression from equation (1).36 The theory predicts that repression
is negatively correlated with democratic change and positively correlated with riots.
Consequently, failing to control for repression biases the estimate of  towards zero,
which would work against us nding a coe¢ cient that is signicantly di¤erent from
zero. This means that our estimate of the e¤ect of riots on democratic change should
be viewed as a lower bound on the true causal e¤ect.
A related issue is that rain might discourage or stop riots; for example, travel may
become more di¢ cult and people may dislike getting wet. One might then think that
drought is correlated with riots not because economic conditions provide a reason to
protest, but because the lack of rain makes riots possible (given some other underlying
cause for the riots). However, this is unlikely to be a problem at an annual level of
aggregation. Even in years with heavy rainfall, there will be periods without rain; riots
could happen in those periods even if rain, in general, deters riots.
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6 Conclusions
This paper has shown that riots triggered by drought lead to democratic change. In
doing so, it provides new evidence that conict can lead to institutional change. While
most work in this area has focused on international wars and their impact on institu-
tional change over long periods of time, we have shown that low intensity conict can
also lead to change in relatively short periods of time.
We have shown that droughts increase riots, which in turn lead to more democratic
institutions. These results are driven by cases in which democratic concessions were
made as a result of riots, and so they support the theory of democratic change formu-
lated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2006). Although our focus on the recent
experience of sub-Saharan Africa is somewhat specic, our study adds to a growing
literature that nds evidence in support of this theory: Aidt and Jensen (2011) nd
evidence of this mechanism when they look at the international di¤usion of informa-
tion about revolutionary events in Europe in the period 1820-1938; Aidt and Franck
(2014) establish a link between local riots and support for the Great Reform Act of
1832 in Britain; Przeworski (2009) studies the correlation between franchise extensions
and the threat of revolution in a large sample of countries. Overall, this body of
work provides compelling evidence in support of the central mechanism in Acemoglu
and Robinsons (2000, 2001, 2006) theory of political transitions, as many episodes of
democratic change, both today and in the past, are the result of concessions made by
governing elites in response to what they perceived to be threats to the established
order.
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Notes
1This question has received a considerable amount of attention in political science and political
economy, with seminal contributions by Lipset (1959), Moore (1966), and more recently Przeworski et
al. (2000), Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), and Congleton
(2011).
2We focus on droughts (large negative rainfall shocks) rather than on rainfall levels because we
expect a link between rainfall and riots only in years of drought; that is, the relationship between
rain and riots is highly non-linear. For example, we do not expect that a rainfall shock that reduces
the rainfall level from above to just below the median will trigger riots, as agricultural production
would only be marginally a¤ected. Riots and social unrest are triggered by large negative shocks that
seriously disrupt agricultural production.
3In the context of the 1974 revolution in Ethiopia, Berhanu (1998, p. 82) explains that the
progressive deterioration of the quality of life for many Ethiopians was aggravated by a major drought-
induced famine (1973-74) that killed hundreds of thousands. This increased the unpopularity of the
regime... Similarly, Appiah and Gates (2010, p. 234) explain the causes of the 1974 revolt against
Diori in Niger by arguing that Diori managed to maintain order until the devastating drought reached
its peak in 1973. Popular unrest escalated into riots when evidence emerged that Diori and members of
his administration were enriching themselves with diverted foreign food aid.More recently, referring
to the 1990 Sudan famine, de Waal (1997, p. 103) explains that [f]oreign NGOs planned to distribute
food in rural areas: the government wanted to divert it to the towns. In one instance, after a food
riot in Um Ruwaba town, NGO relief food intended for displaced Southerners was commandeered at
gunpoint and distributed to the towns residents.
4Using data from the Encyclopaedia Britannica and other sources, we found that 28 of the 43 large
changes in the democracy measure in our sample involved democratic concessions by the incument
government.
5The work by Berger and Spoerer (2001), however, indicates that there was a strong link between
poor economic conditions and the European revolutions of 1848.
6Franck (2012) establishes a causal link between short-term variations in local tax income (instru-
mented by rainfall levels) in 19th century France and electoral support for democratic institutions.
7See Ciccone (2011) and Miguel and Satyanath (2011) for a discussion of these results.
8There are several other reasons why the window of opportunity may be open in situations where
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riots are widespread, which do not require that the initial riots be directed at regime change. First, an
e¤ective regime challenge requires coordination, and riots may serve as a focal point or a public signal
that, in the spirit of Ellis and Fender (2011), helps overcome this coordination problem. Second, as
stressed by Tullock (1974) and Kuran (1989), revolt requires leadership, and opposition leaders might
be able to redirect the dissatisfaction with economic conditions to dissatisfaction with the existing
regime. This line of reasoning also makes it clear that preemptive democratic change need not (and
often does not) result in voting rights and increased political inuence being granted to those who
riot. All that is required is for those who might take advantage of the situation or provide leadership
for a regime challenge to be granted increased and lasting political rights.
9Aidt and Jensen (2011) present a mathematical model of regime transitions in the tradition of
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) that formalizes these predictions and shows the conditions under
which revolution can happen on the equilibrium path.
10The countries are listed in Table A1 in the online appendix.
11A major advantage of the Polity IV data is that they are coded in a systematic way for a large
number of countries for a long time span. However, it has been noted that they do not capture aspects
of democratization related to su¤rage reforms very well (Aidt and Eterovic, 2011), and that changes
within the middle range of the scale of the Polity IV index are di¢ cult to interpret (Cheibub, Gandhi,
Vreeland, 2010).
12We note that of 43 regime changes observed in the data, 7 were anti-democratic and 36 were pro-
democratic. Hence, we feel it is reasonable to think of this binary variable as a measure of democratic
change. We decided against dropping instances of anti-democratic change because that would have
introduced a selection problem.
13More details on the coding can be found in the online appendix.
14These involved searching for each country name and the codewords protestor strikeor riot
or violenceor attackin the following wire services: Agence France Presse - English, The Associated
Press, Associated Press Online, and Associated Press Worldstream. The articles were then inspected
to determine the type of incident they referred to and to avoid double-counting. For more details, see
www.scaddata.org.
15All GIS data uses the world equidistant-cylindrical projection.
16We exclude 75 riots which are recorded as being part of an ongoing civil war. The original number
of riots in the dataset is 7,337, so that we are left with a net total of 7,262.
17There are a total of 7,262 events in the dataset (after excluding events that are part of an ongoing
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civil war), of which only 67 ended in a year di¤erent from their start year. In these cases we allocated
them to the year in which they started.
18To ensure consistency with previous work, we draw on data from Ciccone (2011) and Miguel and
Satyanath (2011).
19Benson and Clay (1998) propose several di¤erent denitions of drought. We follow Brückner and
Ciccone (2010) and adopt a physical (rather than economic) denition. We use a 20th percentile
threshold, so that the country-years with the 20% lowest rainfall levels will be considered to be
experiencing a drought. The results are similar if we use a 15th percentile threshold.
20They calculate the price index for country c in year t as follows:
indexct =
19X
i=1
!ciPit;
where !ci is the export share of commodity i (assumed to be xed over time) and Pit is its price. For
more details, see Brückner and Ciccone (2010).
21We are grateful to Markus Brückner and Antonio Ciccone for making their data available to us.
22Table A2 in the online appendix shows the summary statistics for the main variables.
23Our results are robust to using contemporaneous growth in GDP per capita, as suggested by
Barron, Miguel and Satyanath (2013), and to using growth in GDP per capita lagged twice. See
Table A3 in the online appendix for the details.
24This introduces what is known as Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981); we return to this issue when we
discuss our results.
25Table A2 in the online appendix shows that the standard deviation is 1.744, so 1:744  0:014 =
0:024
26The di¤erence in the number of observations in columns 2 and 3 is due to di¤erences in how
Burke and Leigh (2010) and Brückner and Ciccone (2011) deal with years in which a country was in
interregnum. Burke and Leigh (2010) set the transition variable to 0, while Brückner and Ciccone
(2011) set the polity2 variable to missing.
27We lose some observations because conditional logit estimation uses only countries with variation
in the transitions, binary variable (i.e. that experience both years with a transition and years without
a transition) during the sample period.
28We report estimates using GDP data from the World Development Indicators (2011).
29We include drought lagged twice. This is because we use variables dated t-2 to instrument for
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riots at t-1, which is the variable that appears in equation (1).
30In the online appendix we present a number of results where we allow riots to have a di¤erent
impact on democratic change depending on whether they happen in urban or rural areas. We nd no
large di¤erences in the impact di¤erent types of riots have on democratic change.
31We adopt the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator instead of the system estimator because it involves
fewer internal instruments.
32The Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) errors rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, while
the test for AR(2) errors does not reject the null. Moreover, the Hansen test does not reject the null
hypothesis of valid instruments.
33In the long-run, polity2 reaches a steady-state, i.e. polity2 t =polity2 t 1, and so the long-run e¤ect
is 0:2291 0:803 = 1:162 (on a scale from -10 to 10).
34It is also possible, as suggested in Aidt and Albornoz (2011), that foreign governments might
induce or encourage regime transitions in the wake of adverse economic shocks.
35The drawback of this strategy is that it is only credible when the threat of revolutionis perceived
to be real. For this reason, it is often insu¢ cient to avoid a regime challenge, and the incumbent must
then resort to either democratic reform or repression.
36The logic with regards to omitted food subsidies and international food aid is the same.
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Map 1: Riots in Africa, 1990-2007 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Pre-transition riot activity 
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Notes: Average number of riots is the log of riots averaged across the countries in the sample. 
Transition, binary is used to identify when t=0. The number of observations is not the same in 
all years. 
Table 1: Structural and Reduced Form Regressions 
(A) Structural Regressions: Riots and Democratic Change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
Polity2t Transition, 
binaryt 
 OLS OLS OLS Conditional 
Logit 
     
Riots t-1, logs 0.014† 
(0.007) 
0.036** 
(0.015) 
0.117 
(0.076) 
0.260 
(0.162) 
GDP per capita growtht-1 -0.111 
(0.132) 
0.239 
(0.373) 
2.453 
(1.567) 
-2.709 
(4.012) 
Polity2 t-1   0.710*** 
(0.032) 
 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 624 625 597 442 
     
(B) Reduced Form: Drought and Democratic Change 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
Polity2t 
 OLS OLS OLS 
Instrument:    
Droughtt-2 0.159*** 
(0.056) 
0.339** 
(0.149) 
0.599 
(0.511) 
    
Controls:    
GDP per capita growtht-1 -0.153 
(0.128) 
0.121 
(0.376) 
2.434 
(1.753) 
Polity2t-1   0.713*** 
(0.033) 
    
Country fixed effects Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y 
    
Observations 640 641 605 
Notes: † significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered 
by country and reported in parentheses. Column 4 in section (A) reports conditional logit coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: 2SLS, Riots and Democratic Change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
 (A) 2SLS 
Riots t-1, logs (instrumented) 0.440 0.936 0.483 1.004 
GDP per capita growth t-1 (instrumented) - - -0.607 2.119 
     A-R Wald, F (p-value) [0.016] [0.055] [0.052] [0.155] 
     A-R Wald, Chi-sq (p-value) [0.007] [0.035] [0.027] [0.109] 
     Stock-Wright LM (p-value) [0.054] [0.091] [0.114] [0.238] 
GDP per capita growth t-1 Y Y - - 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 624 625 603 604 
 (B) First Stage for Riots t-1, logs 
     
Droughtt-2 0.380** 
(0.152) 
0.378** 
(0.164) 
0.349** 
(0.158) 
0.346** 
(0.157) 
Commodity price index growth t-1 - - 0.043 
(0.515) 
0.055 
(0.514) 
GDP per capita growth t-1 Y Y - - 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
     
F-statistic for instrument; Angrist-
Pischke F test when multiple instruments 
(p-value in parentheses) 
6.22 
(0.017) 
6.15 
(0.018) 
4.76 
(0.036) 
4.75 
(0.036) 
Observations 624 625 603 604 
 (C) First Stage for GDP per capita growtht-1 
Droughtt-2   0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Commodity price index growth t-1   -0.039 
(0.036) 
-0.039 
(0.036) 
Country fixed effects   Y Y 
Year effects   Y Y 
     
Angrist-Pischke F test for multiple 
instruments (p-value in parentheses) 
  1.15 
(0.290) 
1.13 
(0.294) 
Observations   603 604 
Notes: In part (A) we report p-values for three significance tests in brackets; these are tests of the significance of the endogenous regressor(s) in the 
structural equation, where the null is that it equals (they jointly equal) zero and that the over-identifying restrictions (where relevant) are valid. These 
tests are robust to weak instruments, and the versions we implement are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-country correlation in the errors. 
In parts (B) and (C) standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses (); † indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at 
the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: 2SLS, Riots and Democratic Change, Concessions Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
 (A) 2SLS 
Riots t-1, logs (instrumented) 0.399 0.942 0.435 1.021 
GDP per capita growtht-1 
(instrumented) 
- - -0.169 0.187 
     A-R Wald, F (p-value) [0.026] [0.057] [0.082] [0.135] 
     A-R Wald, Chi-sq (p-value) [0.014] [0.037] [0.048] [0.092] 
     Stock-Wright LM (p-value) [0.074] [0.093] [0.175] [0.200] 
GDP per capita growtht-1 Y Y - - 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 624 625 603 604 
 (B) First Stage for Riots t-1, logs 
     
Droughtt-2 0.380** 
(0.152) 
0.378** 
(0.152) 
0.349** 
(0.158) 
0.346** 
(0.157) 
Commodity price index growth t-1 - - 0.043 
(0.515) 
0.055 
(0.514) 
GDP per capita growtht-1 Y Y - - 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Year effects Y Y Y Y 
     
F-statistic for instrument; Angrist-
Pischke F test when multiple 
instruments (p-value in parentheses) 
6.22 
(0.017) 
6.15 
(0.018) 
4.76 
(0.036) 
4.75 
(0.036) 
Observations 624 625 603 604 
 (C) First Stage for GDP per capita growtht-1 
Droughtt-2   0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Commodity price index growth t-1   -0.039 
(0.036) 
-0.039 
(0.036) 
Country fixed effects   Y Y 
Year effects   Y Y 
     
Angrist-Pischke F test for multiple 
instruments (p-value in parentheses) 
  1.15 
(0.290) 
1.13 
(0.204) 
Observations   603 604 
Notes: In this table we only consider transitions where concessions were made by the incumbent; in all other cases the dependent variable is set 
equal to 0. In part (A) we report p-values for three significance tests in brackets; these are tests of the significance of the endogenous regressor(s) in 
the structural equation, where the null is that it equals (they jointly equal) zero and that the over-identifying restrictions (where relevant) are valid. 
These tests are robust to weak instruments, and the versions we implement are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-country correlation in the 
errors. In parts (B) and (C) standard errors are clustered and reported in parentheses (); † indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, 
*** at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Dynamic Specification with Polity2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Polity2t Polity2t Polity2t 
 Arellano-Bond GMM Arellano-Bond GMM LSDV 
    
Riots t-1, logs 0.329 
(0.236) 
0.492† 
(0.292) 
0.131† 
(0.067) 
GDP per capita growth t-1 3.513 
(2.477) 
21.668 
(15.938) 
2.851 
(1.828) 
Polity2t-1 0.916*** 
(0.089) 
0.975*** 
(0.114) 
0.803*** 
(0.036) 
Country fixed effect Y Y Y 
Year effect Y Y Y 
    
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test, p-value 0.000  0.001 0.000 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test, p-value 0.826 0.649 0.812 
Excluded Instrument(s): Droughtt-2 Droughtt-2 
Commodity price index 
growth t-1 
- 
Sargan overid test, p-value - - 0.990 
Hansen overid test, p-value 0.983 0.571 - 
Observations 546 529 546 
Notes: † significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. The standard errors in the Arellano-Bond specification 
are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The Arellano-Bond result is based on using one 
lag in levels as instruments. The Arellano-Bond (1991) tests for autocorrelation test the null hypothesis of no first and second order 
serial autocorrelation in the errors against the alternative of AR(1) and AR(2), respectively. LSDV standard errors are bootstrapped with 
100 repetitions (but the coefficient on riots stays significant with 10, 20 and 50 repetitions). The LSDV estimation uses Arellano-Bond 
and not system GMM. 
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1 Political transition variables
We use the Polity IV database to construct three di¤erent and complementary measures
of political change. The Polity IV database contains a number of di¤erent indicators of
political authority, and is built around the polity IV index. This index codes three key
aspects of a countrys political system: i) competitiveness and openness in the process
of executive recruitment, ii) constraints on the chief executive, and iii) competitiveness
and regulation of political participation. A weighted sum of the components is used
to construct two summary variables, measuring democracy on a scale of 0 to 10 (the
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DEMOC score) and autocracy on a scale of -10 to 0 (the AUTOC score). The polity
IV index is the sum of these two sub-indexes.
We use this database to construct three di¤erent measures of democratic change.
Our rst two variables, transition; binary and transition; count, are based on the
regtrans variable. The Polity IV manual (p.35) denes regtrans as follows: The
Polity has undergone a substantive regime transition between period t 1 and t, dened
as a regime change. A regime changeis dened simply as a three-point change in
either the politys DEMOC or AUTOC score.A score of +3 corresponds to a major
democratic transition dened as an increase of six points or more in the Polity IV
score over a period of three years or less, including a shift from an autocratic Polity
IV value (-10 to 0) to a partial democratic Polity IV value (+1 to +6) or to a full
democratic Polity IV value (+7 to +10); or a shift from a partial democratic value to a
full democratic value. A score of +2 corresponds to a minor regime change, dened
as a three to ve point increase in the Polity IV index over a period of three years or
less, including a shift from autocratic to partial democratic. A score of +1 corresponds
to a positive regime change, dened as an increase of three or more points in the
Polity IV score without a shift in regime type, as dened for scores of +2 and +3. A
score of -1 corresponds to a negative regime change, dened as a 3 to 5 point drop
in the Polity IV index. A score of -2 corresponds to an adverse regime transition,
dened as a six or more point decrease in the Polity IV index, or a collapse of central
state authority or a revolutionary transformation in the mode of governance (not a
democratic transition). We also use the polity2 variable, which is a version of the
Polity IV index that has been corrected to allow for use in time series analysis.
2
2 Urban Riots
2.1 Baseline
In our paper we argue that riots threaten the incumbent regime, which may then
respond by making democratic concessions. Urban riots are often viewed as a much
more serious threat to the government than rural riots, and so we check whether our
results are robust to focusing only on that type of riot. If our results go away, then
this would raise some doubts regarding the interepretation of our results. To determine
which riots happen in urban areas, we use the GIS map 1km 2010 Africa population
distributionfrom Afripop, which is a digital map with 1 square kilometer cells that
record the population in that area. These data are shown in Map A1. Using our GIS
riots data, we can then assign a population value to each riot, which we then turn into
a binary variable where an area is considered to be urban if the population is more
than 100 individuals per square kilometer.
[Map A1: Population Density in Africa, 2010]
Our results are presented in Table A4. We nd that the coe¢ cient on urban riots in
column 1 is similar to those in column 3 in Table 2, and that the endogenous variables
are jointly signicant according to two of the three p-values reported. The results in
column 2 are also similar to those in column 4 in Table 2. In Table A5 we run the
Arellano-Bond GMM and the LSDV, and the coe¢ cients are positive, although not
signicant.
[Table A4: 2SLS, Urban Riots]
[Table A5: Dynamic Specication, Urban Riots]
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However, it is unclear where the boundary between urban and rural should lie, and
in fact it is likely that such discrete labelling is not appropriate. To address this issue
we re-estimate our specication using three di¤erent weighted riots measures, where
more weight is given to riots that happen in more populated areas, closer to the capital
city, or in countries where the population is more concentrated around the capital.
2.2 Weighted Riots Results
We rst create a riot measure where riots are given weights that depend on the pop-
ulation of the location in which they occur. As a result, riots that happen in more
urbanized areas carry a larger weight. We again use the GIS map 1km 2010 Africa
population distribution from Afripop, and assign a population density to each riot,
with the log of population density becoming their weight.1
Table A6 shows the results for the 2SLS. The middle of the table shows the rst
stage results for riots weighted by population density, where the F-stat is quite low; the
bottom of the table shows the rst stage for GDP per capita growth. The top of the
table presents the results for the 2SLS: when using the binary variable, the coe¢ cient
is 0.594, which is similar to what we found before, and signicant according to two of
the three p-values. The second column, which looks at the count variable, has a large
coe¢ cient. Table A7 presents the results for the dynamic specication using polity2,
where little changes relative to Table 4 in the paper.
[Table A6: Riots weighted by Population Density]
[Table A7: Dynamics]
However, riots in and near the capital city may be more threatening to the regime
1We use logs because population density is highly skewed, with a few cities (e.g., Lagos) having
very large values.
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than riots further away, even if some of these regions are heavily populated. To consider
this issue we create a new weighted riots variable, where the weights are now given by
the inverse of the log distance between the location of the riots and the capital city of
the country in which they happen. Riots that happen closer to the capital city receive
a larger weight. Data for the location of the capital cities are from the CShapes dataset
(Wedmann, Kuse and Gleditsch, 2010). Table A8 presents the results: although the
rst stage results are quite similar, the coe¢ cients on the second stage are twice as
large. Table A9 presents the results for the dynamic specication using polity2, where
the coe¢ cients are twice as large as those in Table A7.
[Table A8: Riots weighted by Distance to Capital City]
[Table A9: Dynamics]
Finally, Do and Campante (2009) argue that the concentration of population around
the capital city can act as a substitute for governance institutions, providing checks
on the behavior of (autocratic) rulers.2 The theory is that population concentration in
and around the capital makes it easier for opposition groups to channel popular unrest
into a regime challenge. Building on this logic, we conjecture that riots represent a
greater threat in countries where people live closer to the center of power. To capture
this empirically, we create a weighted riots measure where the weight is equal to the
gravity-based measure of population concentration around the capital city, centrality,
constructed by Campante and Do (2010).3 The results are presented in Tables A10
2To substantiate this claim, Do and Campante (2009) report a positive association between popu-
lation concentration near the capital city and better governance and more redistribution.
3Campante and Do (2010) construct two centered indices of spatial concentration, PCI1 and PCI2.
We use PCI2, which is normalized by population size and the maximum distance within each country.
Using PCI1 instead does not change our qualitative results. The index is available for 1990, 1995 and
2000, but shows little within country variation over time, so we use the index value in 1990 in the
estimations.
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and A11, and are similar to those when riots are weighted by their distance to the
capital (Tables A8 and A9).
[Table A10: Riots weighted by Centrality]
[Table A11: Dynamics]
References
[1] Do, Quoc-Anh and Filipe Campante, 2009. "Keeping Dictators Honest: The Role
of Population". Research Collection, School of Economics, Paper 1135.
[2] Campante, Filipe and Quoc-Anh Do, 2010. "A Centered Index of Spatial Concen-
tration: Expected Inuence Approach and Application to Population and Capital
Cities". Unpublished manuscript.
[3] Weidmann, Nils B., Doreen Kuse and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2010. "The Ge-
ography of the International System: TheCShapes Dataset." International Interac-
tions 36(1).
6
ONLINE APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table A1: Countries in Dataset 
 
Angola Ghana Nigeria 
Benin Guinea Rwanda 
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Senegal 
Burkina Faso Ivory Coast Sierra Leone 
Burundi Kenya Somalia 
Central African Rep Lesotho South Africa 
Cameroon Liberia Sudan 
Chad Madagascar Swaziland 
Republic of Congo Malawi Togo 
DR Congo Mali Tanzania 
Djibouti Mauritania Uganda 
Ethiopia Mozambique Zambia 
Gabon Namibia Zimbabwe 
The Gambia Niger  
   
 
 
 
Table A2: Summary Statistics 
      
 Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max. Observations 
      
Transition, binary 0.057 0.232 0 1 757 
Transition, count 0.083 0.531 -2 3 758 
Polity2 -0.476 5.616 -10 9 712 
      
Riots, logs 2.509 1.744 0 7.249 700 
Drought 0.199 0.400 0 1 758 
GDP per capita growth 0.005 0.063 -0.699 0.316 680 
Commodity price index growth 0.023 0.175 -0.382 0.744 637 
      
Notes: Transition, binary refers to a modified version of the regtrans variable in the Polity IV database, and it equals one if a political 
change was initiated in that year (as captured by regtrans), and zero otherwise. Transition, count takes an integer value between -2 and 3 and 
captures the direction and size of the transition, but only in its first year. Riots are calculated by adding up the duration (in days) of all riots 
that happened in a given year; different riots are counted individually even if they occurred on the same day. Drought is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the average rainfall in the year was in the bottom quintile of the rain distribution for Sub-Saharan Africa. GDP per capita 
growth  is calculated using data from the World Development Indicators (2011), while commodity price index growth is from Brückner and 
Ciccone (2010) and is calculated using country-specific baskets of exported commodities. We include data from 1989 for the variables for 
which they are available (i.e., not for riots). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Robustness to using different lags of GDP per capita growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
 All All Only Concessions Only Concessions 
 (A) Robustness to using GDP per capita growth at t 
 2SLS 
Riots t-1, logs (instrumented) 0.440 0.935 0.399 0.942 
     A-R Wald, F (p-val) [0.016] [0.054] [0.026] [0.057] 
     A-R Wald, Chi-sq (p-val) [0.007] [0.035] [0.014] [0.037] 
     Stock-Wright LM (p-val) [0.054] [0.091] [0.074] [0.093] 
GDP p/capt growth Y Y Y Y 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 624 625 624 625 
 First Stage for Riots t-1, logs 
Droughtt-2 0.380** 0.377** 0.380** 0.377** 
GDP p/capt growth Y Y Y Y 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
     
F statistic for instrument 
(p-val in parentheses) 
6.13 
(0.018) 
6.06 
(0.019) 
6.13 
(0.018) 
6.06 
(0.019) 
Observations 624 625 624 625 
 (B) Robustness to using GDP per capita growth at t-2 
 2SLS 
Riots t-1, logs (instrumented) 0.391 0.811 0.360 0.834 
     A-R Wald, F (p-val) [0.052] [0.151] [0.077] [0.143] 
     A-R Wald, Chi-sq (p-val) [0.033] [0.119] [0.053] [0.111] 
     Stock-Wright LM (p-val) [0.090] [0.169] [0.120] [0.163] 
GDP p/capt-2 growth Y Y Y Y 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 586 587 586 587 
 First Stage for Riots t-1, logs 
Droughtt-2 0.353† 
(0.184) 
0.350† 
(0.184) 
0.353† 
(0.184) 
0.350† 
(0.184) 
GDP p/capt-2 growth Y Y Y Y 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
     
F statistic for instrument 
(p-val in parentheses) 
3.70 
(0.062) 
3.64 
(0.064) 
3.70 
(0.062) 
3.64 
(0.064) 
Observations 586 587 586 587 
Notes: † significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (). We report p-values for three 
significance tests in brackets; these are tests of the joint significance of the endogenous regressor in the structural equation, where the null is that it equals zero 
and that the over-identifying restrictions (where relevant) are valid. Their primary appeal in our case lies in that they are robust to weak instruments, and the 
versions we implement are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-country correlation in the errors. 
Map A1: Population Density in Africa, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4: 2SLS, Urban Riots 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
 All All Only Concessions Only Concessions 
 2SLS 
     
Urban Riots t-1, logs (instrumented) 0.474 0.983 0.427 1.001 
GDP p/capt-1 growth (instrumented) 2.209 7.806 2.367 5.975 
     A-R Wald, F (p-val) [0.052] [0.155] [0.082] [0.135] 
     A-R Wald, Chi-sq (p-val) [0.027] [0.109] [0.048] [0.092] 
     Stock-Wright LM (p-val) [0.114] [0.238] [0.175] [0.200] 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 603 604 603 604 
 First Stage for Urban Riots t-1, logs 
     
Droughtt-2 0.339 
(0.211) 
0.338 
(0.211) 
0.339 
(0.211) 
0.338 
(0.211) 
Commodity Price Index growth t-1 .276 
(0.423) 
0.279 
(0.424) 
0.276 
(0.423) 
0.279 
(0.424) 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
     
Angrist-Pischke F test for excluded 
instruments (p-val in parentheses) 
2.80 
(0.103) 
2.78 
(0.104) 
2.80 
(0.103) 
2.78 
(0.104) 
Observations 603 604 603 604 
 First Stage for GDP p/cap growtht-1 
     
Droughtt-2 .003 
(.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Commodity Price Index growth t-1 -.039 
(.036) 
-0.039 
(0.036) 
-0.039 
(0.036) 
-0.039 
(0.036) 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
     
Angrist-Pischke F test for excluded 
instruments (p-val in parentheses) 
1.17 
(.287) 
1.14 
(.292) 
1.17 
(0.287) 
1.14 
(0.292) 
Observations 603 604 603 604 
Notes: † significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (). We report p-values for three 
significance tests in brackets; these are tests of the joint significance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation, where the null is that they equal 
zero and that the over-identifying restrictions (where relevant) are valid. Their primary appeal in our case lies in that they are robust to weak instruments, and 
the versions we implement are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-country correlation in the errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5: Dynamic Specification, Urban Riots 
 (1) (2) 
 Polity2t Polity2t 
 Arellano-Bond GMM LSDV 
   
Urban Riots t-1, logs 0.707 
(0.605) 
0.053 
(0.130) 
GDP p/cap growth t-1 18.872 
(13.801) 
2.625 
(1.809) 
Polity2t-1 1.020*** 
(0.126) 
0.803*** 
(0.036) 
Country Fixed Effect Y Y 
Year Effect Y Y 
   
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test p-val: 0.001 p-val: 0.000  
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test p-val: 0.758 p-val: 0.797 
Excluded Instrument: Droughtt-2 
Commodity Price Index 
growth t-1 
 
Sargan overid test, p-val - 0.988 
Hansen overid test, p-val 0.442 - 
Observations 529 546 
Notes: † significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. The standard errors in 
the Arellano-Bond specification are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation. The Arellano-Bond result is based on using one lag in levels as instruments. The 
Arellano-Bond (1991) tests for autocorrelation test the null hypothesis of no first and second order 
serial autocorrelation in the errors against the alternative of AR(1) and AR(2), respectively. LSDV 
standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 repetitions (but the coefficient on riots stays significant 
with 10, 20 and 50 repetitions). The LSDV estimation uses A-B and not system GMM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A6: 2SLS, Riots weighted by Population and Democratic Change 
 (1) (2) 
 Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
 2SLS 
   
Riots weighted by pop t-1, logs (instrumented) 0.594 1.239 
GDP p/cap growth t-1 (instrumented) 3.690 11.288 
     A-R Wald, F (p-val) [0.052] [0.155] 
     A-R Wald, Chi-sq (p-val) [0.027] [0.109] 
     Stock-Wright LM (p-val) [0.114] [0.238] 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y 
   
Observations 603 604 
 First Stage for Riots weighted by population t-1, logs 
   
Droughtt-2 0.264 
(0.175) 
0.261 
(0.175) 
Commodity Price Index growth t-1 0.317 
(0.565) 
0.330 
(0.563) 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y 
   
Angrist-Pischke F test for excluded 
instruments (p-val in parentheses) 
2.64 
(0.113) 
2.60 
(0.115) 
Observations 603 604 
   
 First Stage for GDP p/cap growth t-1 
   
Droughtt-2 0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Commodity Price Index growth t-1 -0.039 
(0.036) 
-0.039*** 
(0.036) 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y 
   
Angrist-Pischke F test for excluded 
instruments (p-val in parentheses) 
1.16 
(0.288) 
1.14 
(0.294) 
Observations 603 604 
Notes: †significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (). Riots 
are weighted by population density: we use the log of the population density in the location of the riot as a weight, with greater 
population resulting in a larger weight. We report p-values for three significance tests in brackets; these are tests of the joint 
significance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation, where the null is that they equal zero and that the over-
identifying restrictions (where relevant) are valid. Their primary appeal in our case lies in that they are robust to weak 
instruments, and the versions we implement are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-country correlation in the errors. 
 
 
 
Table A7: Dynamic Specification, 
Riots weighted by Population and Democratic Change 
 (1) (2) 
 Polity2t Polity2t 
 Arellano-Bond GMM LSDV 
   
Riots t-1, logs 0.478† 
(.286) 
0.128** 
(0.062) 
GDP p/cap growth t-1 21.362 
(15.910) 
2.823 
(1.814) 
Polity2t-1 0.994*** 
(0.114) 
0.804*** 
(0.036) 
Country Fixed Effect Y Y 
Year Effect Y Y 
   
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test p-val: 0.001  p-val: 0.000 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test p-val: 0.601 p-val: 0.797 
Excluded Instrument: Droughtt-2 
Commodity Price Index 
growth t-1 
 
Sargan overid test - p-val: 0.990 
Hansen overid test p-val: 0.599 - 
Observations 529 546 
Notes: †significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. The standard errors in the Arellano-
Bond specification are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
Arellano-Bond result is based on using one lag in levels as instruments. The Arellano-Bond (1991) tests for 
autocorrelation test the null hypothesis of no first and second order serial autocorrelation in the errors against the 
alternative of AR(1) and AR(2), respectively. LSDV standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 repetitions (but 
the coefficient on riots stays significant with 10, 20 and 50 repetitions). The LSDV estimation uses A-B and not 
system GMM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8: 2SLS, Riots weighted by Distance to Capital City 
and Democratic Change 
 (1) (2) 
 Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
 2SLS 
   
Riots weighted by distt-1, logs 
(instrumented) 
1.132 2.370 
GDP p/cap growth t-1 (instrumented) 3.291 10.793 
     A-R Wald, F (p-val) [0.052] [0.155] 
     A-R Wald, Chi-sq (p-val) [0.027] [0.109] 
     Stock-Wright LM (p-val) [0.114] [0.238] 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y 
   
Observations 603 604 
 First Stage for Riots weighted by distance t-1, logs 
   
Droughtt-2 0.139† 
(0.074) 
0.137† 
(0.074) 
Commodity Price Index growth t-1 0.153 
(0.304) 
0.164 
(0.303) 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y 
   
Angrist-Pischke F test for excluded 
instruments (p-val in parentheses) 
3.87 
(0.057) 
3.78 
(0.060) 
Observations 603 604 
   
 First Stage for GDP p/cap growth t-1 
   
Droughtt-2 0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Commodity Price Index growth t-1 -0.039 
(0.036) 
-0.039 
(0.036) 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y 
   
Angrist-Pischke F test for excluded 
instruments (p-val in parentheses) 
1.16 
(0.288) 
1.14 
(0.293) 
Observations 603 604 
Notes: †significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (). 
Riots are weighted by distance to the capital city: we use the inverse of the log distance to the capital as the weight, with a 
greater distance resulting in a lower weight. We report p-values for three significance tests in brackets; these are tests of the 
joint significance of the endogenous regressors in the structural equation, where the null is that they equal zero and that the 
over-identifying restrictions (where relevant) are valid. Their primary appeal in our case lies in that they are robust to weak 
instruments, and the versions we implement are robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-country correlation in the errors. 
 
 
 
 
Table A9: Dynamic Specification, Riots weighted by Distance to Capital City 
and Democratic Change 
 (1) (2) 
 Polity2t Polity2t 
 Arellano-Bond GMM LSDV 
   
Riots t-1, logs 1.015 
(0.646) 
0.216† 
(0.127) 
GDP p/cap growth t-1 21.954 
(15.433) 
2.859 
(1.830) 
Polity2t-1 0.959*** 
(0.120) 
0.803*** 
(0.036) 
Country Fixed Effect Y Y 
Year Effect Y Y 
   
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test p-val: 0.001  p-val: 0.000 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test p-val: 0.656 p-val: 0.786 
Excluded Instrument: Droughtt-2 
Commodity Price Index 
growth t-1 
 
Sargan overid test - p-val: 0.989 
Hansen overid test p-val: 0.591 - 
Observations 529 546 
Notes: †significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. The standard errors in the Arellano-
Bond specification are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
Arellano-Bond result is based on using one lag in levels as instruments. The Arellano-Bond (1991) tests for 
autocorrelation test the null hypothesis of no first and second order serial autocorrelation in the errors against the 
alternative of AR(1) and AR(2), respectively. LSDV standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 repetitions (but 
the coefficient on riots stays significant with 10, 20 and 50 repetitions). The LSDV estimation uses A-B and not 
system GMM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A10: 2SLS, Riots weighted by Centrality and Democratic Change 
 (1) (2) 
 Transition, 
binaryt 
Transition, 
countt 
 2SLS 
   
Riots weighted by centt-1, logs (instrumented) 0.797 1.662 
GDP p/cap growth t-1 (instrumented) 0.857 5.440 
     A-R Wald, F (p-val) [0.052] [0.155] 
     A-R Wald, Chi-sq (p-val) [0.027] [0.109] 
     Stock-Wright LM (p-val) [0.114] [0.238] 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y 
   
Observations 603 604 
 First Stage for Riots weighted by centrality t-1, logs 
   
Droughtt-2 0.206** 
(0.098) 
0.204** 
(0.098) 
Commodity Price Index growth t-1 0.098 
(0.383) 
0.110 
(0.382) 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y 
   
Angrist-Pischke F test for excluded 
instruments (p-val in parentheses) 
4.52 
(0.041) 
4.46 
(0.042) 
Observations 603 604 
   
 First Stage for GDP p/cap growth t-1 
   
Droughtt-2 0.003 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
Commodity Price Index growth t-1 -0.039 
(0.036) 
-0.039 
(0.036) 
Country Fixed Effects Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y 
   
Angrist-Pischke F test for excluded 
instruments (p-val in parentheses) 
1.16 
(0.288) 
1.14 
(0.293) 
Observations 603 604 
Notes: †significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. Clustered standard errors in parentheses (). 
Riots are weighted by centrality, where the weight is set equal to centrality. Since centrality is a country-specific and time-
invariant measure, all riots within a country get the same weight, with a higher centrality resulting in a larger weight. We 
report p-values for three significance tests in brackets; these are tests of the joint significance of the endogenous regressors in 
the structural equation, where the null is that they equal zero and that the over-identifying restrictions (where relevant) are 
valid. Their primary appeal in our case lies in that they are robust to weak instruments, and the versions we implement are 
robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-country correlation in the errors. 
 
 
Table A11: Dynamic Specification, Riots weighted by Centrality 
and Democratic Change 
 (1) (2) 
 Polity2t Polity2t 
 Arellano-Bond GMM LSDV 
   
Riots t-1, logs 0.707 
(0.434) 
0.167† 
(0.094) 
GDP p/cap growth t-1 21.609 
(15.652) 
2.858 
(1.826) 
Polity2t-1 0.969*** 
(0.116) 
0.803*** 
(0.036) 
Country Fixed Effect Y Y 
Year Effect Y Y 
   
Arellano-Bond AR(1) test p-val: 0.001 p-val: 0.000 
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test p-val: 0.606 p-val: 0.787 
Excluded Instrument: Droughtt-2 
Commodity Price Index 
growth t-1 
 
Sargan overid test - p-val: 0.990 
Hansen overid test p-val: 0.569 - 
   
Observations 529 546 
Notes: †significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. The standard errors in the Arellano-
Bond specification are consistent in the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
Arellano-Bond result is based on using one lag in levels as instruments. The Arellano-Bond (1991) tests for 
autocorrelation test the null hypothesis of no first and second order serial autocorrelation in the errors against the 
alternative of AR(1) and AR(2), respectively. LSDV standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 repetitions (but 
the coefficient on riots stays significant with 10, 20 and 50 repetitions). The LSDV estimation uses A-B and not 
system GMM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary appendix 
This appendix contains a short narrative of what happened during each of the 43 regime transitions in our sample. 
We classify them into three categories 
1) Type 1: Regime transitions where democratic concessions by the incumbent government played a role in the transition. 
2) Type 2: Regime transitions triggered by an election or a coup. 
3) Type 3: Regime transitions that were anti-democratic. 
The main sources used to construct the narrative are Encyclopaedia Britannica (http://www.britannica.com/) and Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki). 
Statements in quotation marks are abstracts from the country entry in Encyclopaedia Britannica or Wikipedia. 
Country year What Type Source 
Zimbabwe, 
1999 
“In 1999 a proposed new Constitution of Zimbabwe had been 
drafted by a Constitutional Convention. It was defeated in the 
referendum held the following year. The defeat was 
unexpected and was taken as a personal rebuff for President 
Robert Mugabe and a political triumph for the newly formed 
opposition group, the Movement for Democratic Change. The 
proposal amongst other things included a clause to confiscate 
land from white farmers without compensation.”  
Comment: The fact that a referendum was held and lost to the 
benefit of the opposition is a concession. 
1 Wikipedia 
Britannica 
 
Zambia, 2001 “In 2000 the suggestion was made within the MMD that the 
constitution should be amended to permit Chiluba to stand for 
a third term in the 2001 elections, unleashing a bitter and 
divisive debate within the party which led to the demotion or 
expulsion of members opposing an amendment. Outside the 
party civil society bodies including trade unions, churches and 
the Zambian Law Society rejected tampering with the two term 
limit. Further factions broke with the MMD and formed new 
parties, the most important of which was the Forum for 
1 EISA. 2014. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in 
Africa.  http://eisa.org.za/WEP/zamoverview7.htm. 
Britannica 
 
Democracy Development (FDD) under Christon Tembo. In the 
end Chiluba bowed to pressure from within and without the 
MMD and Levy Mwanawasa, who had resigned the Vice-
Presidency in 1993, was nominated as MMD candidate”. EISA 
(2014). 
Comment: A concession was made to not tamper with 
constitution. 
Zambia, 1996  “General elections were held in Zambia on 18 November 1996 
to elect a President and National Assembly. They were 
boycotted by the main opposition party, the United National 
Independence Party, together with five other allied parties, 
following changes to the constitution which they failed to have 
reversed following a court challenge. The changes required a 
presidential candidate to be born to two Zambian citizens by 
birth or descent, and National Assembly candidates to give up 
their chieftaincy. UNIP believed this was specifically aimed at 
their candidates, Kenneth Kaunda, whose parents were 
Malawian and had previously served several terms as 
president, and its vice president, a chief. Subsequently, the 
ruling Movement for Multi-Party Democracy won a 
comfortable victory in both elections, taking 131 of the 150 
elected seats in the National Assembly, and its candidate, 
Frederick Chiluba, winning 73% of the vote in the presidential 
election.” Wikipedia. 
“Corruption allegations and conflict in the government led to 
the resignation of the several ministers and Vice-President Levy 
Mwanawasa from the government and accusations of ethnic 
favouritism resurfaced within the MMD. Meanwhile the 
government continued to harass Kaunda, placing him under 
surveillance and alleging that he was inciting revolt, while he in 
turn urged a campaign of civil disobedience against the 
government. In 1996 a controversial amendment was passed 
designed to exclude Kaunda and his deputy from standing for 
3 EISA. 2014. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in 
Africa.  http://eisa.org.za/WEP/zamoverview7.htm. 
Wikipedia, Zambian_general_election,_1996. 
Britannica 
 
election later that year. Donors responded by reducing aid, 
while the elections were boycotted by UNIP and five other 
parties that had allied with it over the previous five years. On a 
poll of 58.6%, and in an election fraught with administrative 
problems and allegations of abuse of the state media by the 
MMD, the MMD won 131 of the seats, independents 10 and 
the remaining 9 went to three small parties. Chiluba easily 
retained the presidency with 72.5% of the vote” EISA (2014) 
Comment: Anti-democratic. 
Zambia, 1991 “General elections were held in Zambia on 31 October 1991 to 
elect a President and National Assembly. They were the first 
multi-party elections since 1968, and saw the ruling United 
National Independence Party comprehensively beaten by the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy, whose candidate, 
Frederick Chiluba, beat the incumbent Kenneth Kaunda in the 
presidential election. Voter turnout was 45%.” EISA (2014). 
“In 1989 and 1990 there were further rounds of riots, strikes 
and demonstrations alongside further increases in the prices of 
food and other essential commodities by the state (Mtembu-
Salter 2002, Lambert Undated Holmes 2004). Opposition which 
had been sporadic and mainly spontaneous now took on an 
increasingly organized character as the Zambia Congress of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU), churches, and student groups took the 
leadership. Demands for a return to multi-party democracy 
were increasingly heard from December 1989 onwards and the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) emerged as an 
umbrella body for opposition groups. After initial resistance 
Kaunda and UNIP accepted the principle of multi-party 
democracy and appropriate constitutional amendments were 
made in December 1990, while elections were set for October 
1991 (Mtembu-Salter 2002, Lambert Undated, Columbia 
Encyclopaedia 2005).” Wikipedia 
Comment: This represents a regime change and a concession. 
1 EISA. 2014. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in 
Africa.  http://eisa.org.za/WEP/zamoverview6.htm. 
Wikipedia, Zambian_general_election,_1991 
Britannica 
 
South Africa, 
1992 
“While the Conservative Party claimed that the government did 
not have the mandate to negotiate with the ANC after its 
defeat in Potchefstroom, State President F. W. de Klerk 
announced 20 February, that a national referendum for the 
white electorate would be held to test the government's—and 
his own—support: if the referendum's outcome had been 
negative, de Klerk would have resigned and general elections 
held.” Wikipedia 
Comment: Holding this referendum on Apartheid was clearly a 
concession. 
1 Wikipedia, South_African_apartheid_referendum,_1992 
Uganda, 2005 “Ugandans voted to restore a multi-party political system in a 
constitutional referendum held on 28 July 2005. Political 
parties were barred from competing in elections for nearly 20 
years in order to curb sectarian tensions. President Yoweri 
Museveni instituted the non-party "Movement" system of 
government when he came to power in 1986. Five years earlier, 
in a similar referendum, Ugandans chose to keep the 
restrictions on the parties.” Wikipedia 
Comment: Concession to allow multi-party system. 
1 Wikipedia, Ugandan_multi-party_referendum,_2005. 
Britannica 
 
Uganda, 1993 “Uganda rewrote its constitution in 1995. In 1993 the 
foundation for this was laid with the “Constituent Assembly 
Election Act”. Britannica. 
“Despite the fact that the 1967 constitution provided for 
human rights, rule of law and democratic tenets like separation 
of powers and independence of different arms of governments, 
the same constitution had provision that undermined the 
enjoyment of rights and the independence of the bodies it 
created. One glaring weakness in it was the subjection of rights 
and other aspects of democracy to laws to be made by 
parliament. This gave lee way to parliament of the time to 
make laws that limited the enjoyment of rights. Rights would 
be violated and institutions undermined under the realms of 
the law. This was the basis for which a new constitutional order 
1 Britannica 
 
BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14107906 
 
The Hurinet Blog (2013). http://hurinet.blogspot.co.uk 
/2013/04/review-and-analysis-of-constitution-of.html 
was proposed through the Sempebwa commission of 1993/4.” 
The Hurinet Blog (2013) 
“Since becoming president in 1986 Yoweri Museveni has 
introduced democratic reforms at a steady pace and been 
credited with substantially improving human rights, notably by 
reducing abuses by the army and the police.” BBC. 
Comment:  concession. 
Tanzania, 1995 “Tanzania's first multiparty elections since 1961 took place on 
the 29 October 1995” EISA (2014). Tanzania had a one-party 
system till this point and the election allowed for the first time 
opposition parties to participate. Cranenburgh (1996) argues 
“that in view of the nature and capacities of the new political 
parties and the legal/institutional framework, the expansion of 
both choice and representation is very limited.”  
Comment: Concession. 
1 EISA. 2014. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in 
Africa.   
http://eisa.org.za/WEP/tan1995election2.htm 
 
Oda van Cranenburgh, 1996. Tanzania's 1995 Multi-Party 
Elections: The Emerging Party System Party Politics  2: 535-547. 
 
Britannica 
 
Togo, 1991 “On 5 October 1990, the trial of students who handed out anti-
government tracts sparked riots in Lomé.  Anti-government 
demonstrations and violent clashes with the security forces 
marked the months that followed. In April 1991, the 
government began negotiations with newly formed opposition 
groups and agreed to a general amnesty that permitted exiled 
political opponents to return to Togo. After a general strike and 
further demonstrations, the government and opposition signed 
an agreement to hold a "national forum" on 12 June 1991. The 
national forum, dominated by opponents of President 
Eyadéma, opened in July 1991 and immediately declared itself 
to be a sovereign "National Conference." Although subjected to 
severe harassment from the government, the conference 
drafted an interim constitution calling for a 1-year transitional 
regime tasked with organizing free elections for a new 
government.” Wikipedia.  
Comment: Concession. 
1 Britannica 
Wikipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Togo 
Chad, 1991 “Habré continued to face threats to his regime. In April 1989 
the interior minister, Brahim Mahamot Itno, and two key 
military advisers, Hassan Djamouss and Idriss Déby, were 
suspected of plotting to overthrow Habré. Itno was arrested 
and Djamouss was killed, but Déby escaped and began new 
attacks a year later. By late 1990 his Movement for Chadian 
National Salvation forces had captured Abéché, and Habré fled 
the country. Déby and his forces then took N’Djamena, the 
capital. Déby suspended the constitution and formed a new 
government with himself as president. Although it was 
reported that he had received arms from Libya, he denied 
Libyan involvement and promised to establish a multiparty 
democracy in Chad. Déby’s takeover of the government was 
not without resistance. In 1991 and 1992 there were several 
attacks and coup attempts by opposition forces, many of whom 
were still aligned with Habré, but Déby maintained his grip on 
the government and the country. A national conference was 
held in 1993 to establish a transitional government, and Déby 
was officially designated interim president. In 1996 a new 
constitution was approved and Déby was elected president in 
the first multiparty presidential elections held in Chad’s history. 
Peace was still fragile”. Britannica.  
Comment: coup/overthrow. 
2 Britannica.  
 
http://www.britannica.com/ EBchecked/topic  
/104144/Chad/278146/Continuing-conflict 
Sierra Leone, 
1996 
Brutal civil war in the 1990s. “Strasser was ousted in another 
military coup in January 1996 after it was feared that he would 
not transfer power to a civilian government, as originally 
promised. Brig. Gen. Julius Maada Bio briefly assumed control 
of the government with the pledge that elections would soon 
be held. The RUF, however, requested that elections be 
postponed until it could reach a peace agreement with the 
government; this request was rebuffed, and the RUF intensified 
its violent campaign. Nonetheless, elections were still held: 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party won 
2 Britannica. 
http://www.britannica.com44 
/EBchecked/topic/543356/Sierra-Leone 
/274792/Civil-war 
the presidential election and took office on March 29, 1996. A 
peace agreement between Kabbah and RUF leader Sankoh, 
known as the Abidjan Agreement, was reached later that year 
in November, but it was not successfully implemented.” The 
civil war continued and a sequence of coups followed. “The 
AFRC was overthrown in February 1998 by Economic 
Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) troops, who intervened with the support of the 
international community. President Kabbah’s government was 
restored in March, but ECOMOG and government troops 
continued to battle rebel forces until July 1999, when another 
peace accord—the Lomé Agreement—was signed. The Lomé 
Agreement proposed a power-sharing plan that included 
Sankoh and other rebels in the government and required the 
RUF and the AFRC forces to surrender their weapons.” 
Britannica. 
Comment: Coup. 
Senegal, 2000 “Generally peaceful elections in 1993 resulted in victory for 
Diouf and the PS. The French decision in 1994 to devalue the 
African franc by 50 percent negatively affected the Senegalese 
economy and sparked the most-serious uprisings in the country 
in years, led by dissatisfied urban youths. The government 
quickly crushed the demonstrations and arrested hundreds. 
The difficult economic conditions continued, exacerbated by 
periodic droughts and inflation. Despite the economic 
problems, however, the Diouf regime retained the support of 
the powerful Muslim leadership in the country, and the PS won 
legislative elections again in 1998, although opposition parties 
did make some gains, especially in the urban Dakar region. 
Wade finally won the presidency in March 2000, marking the 
first time since the country’s independence that a presidential 
candidate was elected from a party other than the PS. Wade’s 
victory also ushered in a peaceful and democratic transfer of 
2 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 
/534445/Senegal/255603/Independent-Senegal 
power, a significant event on the African continent. He was 
reelected in 2007.”  Britannica. 
Comment: election.  
Sudan, 2002 “The Sudan Peace Act (Pub.L. 107–245) is a United States 
federal law sponsored by Thomas Tancredo condemning Sudan 
for genocide. President George W. Bush signed the Act into law 
on October 21, 2002. 
The Act was passed to facilitate a comprehensive solution to 
the Second Sudanese Civil War, and condemns violations of 
human rights on all sides of the conflict.” Wikipedia. 
“However, following the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–
2005) and the now-low-scale war in Darfur, Sudan is widely 
recognized as an authoritarian state where all effective political 
power is obtained by President Omar al-Bashir and the ruling 
National Congress Party (NCP). In 1993, Sudan was transformed 
into an Islamic authoritarian single-party state as al-Bashir 
abolished the Revolutionary Command Council and created the 
National Islamic Front (NIF) with a new parliament and 
government obtained solely by members of the NIF. At the 
same time, the structure of regional administration was 
replaced by the creation of twenty-six states, each headed by a 
governor, thus making Sudan a federal republic. Executive 
posts are divided between the NCP, the SPLA, the Sudanese 
Eastern Front and factions of the Umma Party and Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP). According to the new 2005 constitution, 
the bicameral National Legislature is the official Sudanese 
parliament and is divided between two chambers — the 
National Assembly, a lower house with 450 seats, and the 
Council of States, an upper house with 50 seats. Thus the 
parliament consists of 500 appointed members altogether, 
where all are indirectly elected by state legislatures to serve 
six-year terms.” Wikipedia. 
 
1 Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudan_Peace_Act 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudan 
Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 
/571417/Sudan/24328/Nimeiris-overthrow-and-its-aftermath 
“The RCC ruled until 1993. That year it oversaw the transition 
from military rule to a civilian government. Nonetheless, it was 
a civilian government in which the NIF was securely in power, 
as the RCC appointed Bashir to the presidency of the new 
government before disbanding. The first presidential and 
legislative elections since the 1989 coup were held in 1996; 
Bashir won the presidency and was also reelected in 2000. The 
ostensible transformation of the government continued with a 
1998 referendum in which a new constitution was 
overwhelmingly approved. The introduction of multiparty 
politics in 1999, although viewed with pessimism by many, also 
seemed to support the transition to a more democratic 
approach to government. The partial suspension of the new 
constitution later that year, however, tempered optimism, as it 
appeared Sudan was clinging to an authoritarian regime. Also 
that year, Sudan began to export oil, providing the opportunity 
to bring in much-needed revenue to the country’s blighted 
economy.” Britannica. 
Comment: concession to opponents in a civil war. 
Sudan, 1989 “Bashir and his colleagues realized that, as a minority with little 
popular support, they would have to resort to harsh measures 
to curtail the educated elites who had been instrumental in 
organizing populist revolutions in the past. With a ruthlessness 
to which the Sudanese were unaccustomed, the RCC 
imprisoned hundreds of political opponents, banned trade 
unions and political parties, silenced the press, and dismantled 
the judiciary. It sought to prosecute the war in the south with 
vigour, inhibited only by the deterioration of the national 
economy. With the support of the NIF, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and a ruthless and efficient security system, the 
most unpopular government in the modern history of Sudan 
remained firmly in power as the country entered the last 
decade of the 20th century.” Britannica. 
3 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 
/571417/Sudan/24328/Nimeiris-overthrow-and-its-aftermath 
Comment: anti-democratic  
Niger, 1999 “After independence was proclaimed, Diori set up a single-
party dictatorship and ruled until he was toppled in a coup in 
1974. There followed a military dictatorship headed first by 
Seyni Kountché (until his death in 1987) and then by Ali Seibou. 
Mahamane Ousmane of the Social Democratic Convention 
became president in the country’s first multiparty presidential 
elections in 1993. Meanwhile, a Tuareg rebellion that had 
begun in the northern part of the country in the early 1990s 
gained momentum until a cease-fire agreement in 1995 ended 
much of the fighting. Ousmane was ousted in 1996 during a 
military coup led by Col. Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara. After a brief 
period of military rule, Maïnassara was elected president in 
elections marred by anomalies. Maïnassara’s administration 
was not well-received, and in 1999 he was assassinated during 
a coup that was followed by a nine-month transitional 
government led by Maj. Daouda Malam Wanké and the 
National Reconciliation Council (Conseil de Reconciliation 
Nationale; CRN). Later that year a new constitution was 
promulgated and elections were held, leading to the 
subsequent return to democratic government under Pres. 
Mamadou Tandja of the National Movement for a Developing 
Society–Nassara (Mouvement National pour une Société de 
Développement–Nassara; MNSD).” Britannica. 
Comment: Coup  
2 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/414746/Niger/283517/Independence-and-conflict 
Niger, 1996 Military coup. See notes above. 
Comment:  Anti-democratic. 
3 Britannica 
Niger, 1991 “Upon Kountché's death in 1987, he was succeeded by his Chief 
of Staff and cousin, Col. Ali Saibou. Saibou liberalized some of 
Niger's laws and policies, and promulgated a new constitution. 
He released political prisoners, including Diori and his old 
political nemesis Djibo Bakary. However, President Saibou's 
efforts to control political reforms failed in the face of union 
1 Wikipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Niger 
 
 
 
 
and student demands to institute a multi-party democratic 
system. The Saibou regime acquiesced to these demands by 
the end of 1990. New political parties and civic associations 
sprang up, and a National Conference was convened in July 
1991 to prepare the way for the adoption of a new constitution 
and the holding of free and fair elections. The debate was often 
contentious and accusatory, but under the leadership of Prof. 
André Salifou, the conference developed consensus on the 
modalities of a transitional government.” Wikipedia 
Comment: Concession. 
 
  
Malawi, 1993 “On March 8, 1992, a pastoral letter written by Malawian 
Catholic bishops expressing concern at—among other things—
the poor state of human rights, poverty, and their effects on 
family life was read in churches throughout Malawi. This act 
served to encourage underground opposition groups that had 
long waited for an opportunity to mount an open and vigorous 
campaign for multiparty democracy; exile groups also 
intensified their demands for political reform. Additional 
pressure was applied by international donors, who withheld 
financial aid. By the end of 1992, two internally based 
opposition parties, the Alliance for Democracy and the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), had emerged, and Banda agreed to 
hold a national referendum to determine the need for reform. 
Advocates for change won an overwhelming victory, and in 
May 1994 the first free elections in more than 30 years took 
place. Banda was defeated by Bakili Muluzi of the UDF by a 
substantial margin, and the UDF won a majority of seats in the 
National Assembly. Although no longer active, Banda remained 
head of the MCP until his death in November 1997.” Britannica 
Comment: concession. 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 
/359614/Malawi/281535/Colonial-rule 
Mauritania, 
2005 
“In August 2005, while Ould Taya was out of the country, army 
officers staged a successful coup. Col. Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, a 
former close ally of Ould Taya, emerged as the leader of the 
2 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/370109/Mauritania/283211 
ruling Military Council for Justice and Democracy. He pledged 
that democracy would be restored, and in 2006 he presented a 
referendum on constitutional reforms. Voters overwhelmingly 
approved the changes, which included limiting presidents to 
two consecutive terms of five rather than six years. In March 
2007 presidential elections were held, and Sidi Ould Cheikh 
Abdallahi became Mauritania’s first democratically elected 
president.” Britannica 
Comment: Coup. There were fraud-ridden elections in 1992 
and 1997. 
/Struggle-for-postindependence-stability 
Mozambique, 
1994 
“The leaders of Frelimo and Renamo finally accepted a peace 
agreement in October 1992, whereby Frelimo’s leadership 
agreed to change the constitution and to open the political 
process to competing parties in exchange for Renamo’s 
promise to end the war. Issues between the two groups were 
not totally resolved until 1994. The multiparty elections that 
finally took place in October 1994 were the culmination of 
years of effort to reach a peaceful end to the war between 
Frelimo and Renamo. Frelimo, once a self-described Marxist-
Leninist vanguard party and still progressive if not clearly 
socialist, made several important concessions to the peace 
process.” Britannica. 
Comment: concession as part of peace settlement after civil 
war. 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked 
/topic/395363/Mozambique/261043 
/Peace-in-Mozambique 
Mali, 1991 “By 1991 movements for greater democracy had gained a 
foothold in Mali but were rejected by Traoré’s regime, which 
claimed that the country was not ready for such change. 
Demonstrations and riots broke out in major urban centres, 
leading to a military takeover in March 1991 and the 
imprisonment of Traoré. The new military government, led by 
Amadou Toumani Touré, promised a quick return to civilian 
rule and held a national conference attended by major 
associations and unions. Elections were held in 1992, and Alpha 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/360071/Mali/279103/French-West-Africa 
Konaré, a prominent civilian intellectual, won the presidency.” 
Britannica. 
Comment: concession 
Madagascar, 
1991 
“In February 1989 the main opposition groups joined to form 
an alliance, and people and organizations that had formerly 
aligned with the regime began increasingly to withdraw their 
support. Although Ratsiraka was reelected in March 1989, the 
election results gave rise to a round of protests that would 
eventually lead to his ouster and the end of the Second 
Republic. A call by the Council of Malagasy Churches issued in 
August 1989 for the removal of socialist vocabulary from the 
constitution, as well as for an end to the FNDR’s monopoly on 
political life, received wide support. The government 
responded with a series of conciliatory gestures. At first the 
membership of the FNDR was expanded, and then, in March 
1990, the constitution was amended to allow the formation of 
political groups that were not members of the Front. Another 
opposition alliance, the Vital Forces (Forces Vives; FV), was 
created under the leadership of Albert Zafy, a professor at the 
University of Madagascar. Demonstrations favouring 
constitutional change were held, and discussions about a 
possible revision of the constitution continued without yielding 
any agreement. In June 1991 the FV announced the creation of 
a provisional counter-government; this was followed by more 
demonstrations and a general strike. In August the presidential 
guard fired upon a demonstration in front of the presidential 
palace; several people were killed, and others, including Zafy, 
were wounded. Important aid donors, France among them, 
called for an end to the instability. A power-sharing agreement 
between Ratsiraka and the opposition was reached in October 
and opened the way for negotiations on a new constitution. 
Under the terms of the power-sharing agreement, Ratsiraka 
continued as president and Zafy took office as head of a newly 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/355562 
/Madagascar/279551/The-Second-Republic 
created High State Authority.” 
Comment: Concession.  
Lesotho, 1993 “Conflict arose in February 1990 within the Military Council, 
headed by Maj. Gen. Lekhanya, but King Moshoeshoe II refused 
to approve several dismissals from the council. He was 
dethroned and went into exile, and his eldest son, Mohato, was 
sworn in as King Letsie III. Maj. Gen. Lekhanya was forced to 
resign in April 1991 after a successful coup led by Col. Elias 
Tutsoane Ramaema, who lifted the ban on political activity and 
promised a new constitution. The political and economic crises 
continued, however, and demonstrations broke out in Maseru 
in May. General elections first promised in 1992 were finally 
held in March 1993. The BCP returned to power under the 
leadership of Ntsu Mokhehle as prime minister. He appointed a 
commission in July 1994 to examine the circumstances 
surrounding the dethronement of King Moshoeshoe II in 1990. 
King Letsie’s attempt to dismiss the BCP government in August 
1994 proved unsuccessful, and Moshoeshoe was reinstated as 
king in January 1995. Less than a year later, Moshoeshoe died, 
and Letsie reassumed the throne.” Britannica 
Comment: Concession. 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/337126/ 
Lesotho/214041/Political-crisis 
Kenya, 2002 “Moi announced in 2002 that he would not run again for the 
presidency, and Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Jomo Kenyatta, was 
chosen to be KANU’s presidential candidate. Kibaki, this time 
representing a coalition of opposition groups (the National 
Rainbow Coalition [NARC]), soundly defeated Kenyatta in the 
2002 presidential elections, thus ending KANU’s long period of 
uninterrupted rule.” Britannica 
“In 2002, Moi was constitutionally barred from running, and 
Mwai Kǐbakǐ, running for the opposition coalition "National 
Rainbow Coalition" — NARC, was elected President. Anderson 
(2003) reports the elections were judged free and fair by local 
and international observers, and seemed to mark a turning 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/315078 
/Kenya/259596/Kenya-in-the-21st-century 
 
Anderson, David M. (2003). "Kenya's Elections 2002 – The 
Dawning of a New Era?". African Affairs 102 (407): 331–342. 
point in Kenya's democratic evolution.” Anderson (2003) 
Comment: Moi was constitutionally prevented from running 
and he accepted this. We interpret this as a concession. 
Kenya, 1997 “Increasingly, however, Western financial aid came to be tied 
to demands for political and economic reforms. It was for this 
reason that in December 1991 Moi finally accepted a 
constitutional amendment that reinstated multiparty elections. 
When elections were held the following December, however, 
Moi was reelected, and, with the opposition divided, KANU 
won a strong majority in the National Assembly. One 
opposition party, Forum for the Restoration of Democracy 
(FORD), had been founded in 1991 but by 1992 had split into 
two factions: FORD-Kenya, led by Odinga until his death in 
1994, and FORD-Asili, headed by Kenneth Matiba. 
Kibaki, who had left the government late in 1991, became the 
official leader of the opposition after elections in 1997. Many 
Kenyans had hoped that the various opposition parties would 
cooperate and field a single candidate who would oust Moi, but 
there were more than eight on the ballot. Moi, the incumbent, 
used the preexisting political network and won by a large 
margin. Kibaki challenged the results in court, but his case was 
dismissed. When appointing his cabinet, Moi selected KANU 
members and continued to ignore the opposition. However, in 
July 1999, in an apparent change of heart, Moi made Njonjo 
chairman of the Kenya Wildlife Services and Richard Leakey 
head of the civil service and permanent secretary to the 
cabinet. Leakey’s popularity was cited as the main reason Moi 
appointed him to this post; the appointment was also seen as 
Moi’s way of showing Kenya’s commitment to tackling the 
issues of corruption and gross mismanagement in the 
government.” Wikipedia 
“In democratic, multiparty elections in 1992 and 1997, Daniel 
arap Moi won re-election.” Anderson (2003). 
2 Anderson, David M. (2003). "Kenya's Elections 2002 – The 
Dawning of a New Era?". African Affairs 102 (407): 331–342. 
 
Wikipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenya#cite_note-55 
Comment: 1997 was a regular multi-party election where the 
incumbent (Moi) won. It is not an overthrow nor is there any 
obvious concession. 
Guinea-Bissau, 
2005 
“In March 2005 Ialá announced his intention to contest the 
elections scheduled for June of that year, although both he and 
Vieira—who had returned from exile in April—had been barred 
from politics in 2003. Both candidates were subsequently 
cleared to run for office in April. The following month, Ialá 
announced that he was in fact still president and staged a brief 
occupation of the presidential building. Defeated in the first 
round of polling, however, he eventually backed Vieira, who 
won a second round of elections held in July. Although 
supporters of the opposition raised allegations of fraud, the 
elections were declared by international observers to have 
been free and fair.” Britannica 
Comment: Allowing the candidates to run was a concession. 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/248853/Guinea-Bissau/281087/Independence 
Guinea-Bissau, 
2003  
“Despite a democratic beginning, Ialá’s rule became 
increasingly repressive. Widespread discontent with the 
deteriorating economic and political climate led to his removal 
in a bloodless coup in September 2003. Soon after, Henrique 
Rosa, a businessman and virtual political newcomer, was sworn 
in as interim president. Under Rosa’s transitional government, 
legislative elections were held in 2004, moving Guinea-Bissau 
on course toward a stable, constitutional government. While 
forging political peace, Rosa was faced with the task of 
rebuilding the country’s infrastructure and improving the 
economy, both severely damaged from the civil war and years 
of political strife.” Britannica 
Comment: anti-democratic. 
3 Britannica 
Guinea-Bissau, 
1991 
“In Guinea-Bissau in 1989, the ruling African Independence 
Party of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) under the direction of 
President João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira began to outline a 
political liberalization program which the People's National 
1 Widipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Guinea-Bissau 
Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/248853/Guinea-
Assembly approved in 1991. Reforms that paved the way for 
multi-party democracy included the repeal of articles of the 
constitution, which had enshrined the leading role of the 
PAIGC. Laws were ratified to allow the formation of other 
political parties, a free press, and independent trade unions 
with the right to strike.” Widipedia 
“Guinea-Bissau made the transition to a democratic, multiparty 
system in the early 1990s, and the country’s first free legislative 
and presidential elections were held in 1994. The PAIGC won a 
majority of legislative seats, while Vieira narrowly won his 
race.” Britannica 
Comment: The constitutional process gave concession. 
Bissau/281087/Independence 
Gambia, 1994 “In July 1994 a group of young army officers led by Capt. (later 
Col.) Yahya Jammeh staged a bloodless coup, justifying it by 
citing the corruption and mismanagement of Jawara and the 
PPP. The Senegalese government did not intervene as it had 
done in 1981, and Jawara went into exile. The military leaders 
promised a return to civilian rule once corruption had been 
eliminated but meanwhile ruled by proclamation. Dissent was 
brutally repressed, and political activity was banned until 
August 1996. Presidential elections were held late that year, 
with elections for the National Assembly following in early 
1997. Jammeh, now retired from the military, was elected 
president, and his political party, the Alliance for Patriotic 
Reorientation and Construction, dominated the National 
Assembly. A new constitution, approved by voters in 1996, 
came into effect after the legislative elections.” Britannica 
Comment: Anti-democratic. 
3 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/224771/The-Gambia/54967/Independence 
Guinea, 1995 “Although a new constitution was adopted in 1991 and the first 
multiparty elections were held in 1993, the Conté 
government’s move toward political and economic 
liberalization was slow, and civil unrest and protest continued 
during the 1990s. In 1996 the government survived an 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
248802/Guinea/55227/Independence 
Constitution Writing & Conflict Resolution Project (PCWCR) 
https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/ 
attempted military coup. Meanwhile, Guinea became 
embroiled in the ongoing civil wars in neighbouring Sierra 
Leone and Liberia.” Britannica 
“To reduce corruption, parliament began a process to amend 
the constitution. The amendment dissolved the elected 
provincial assemblies whose politicians relied on the ability to 
give favors in return for electoral support. The amendment 
replaced the provincial assemblies with provincial bodies 
comprised of national MPs and local community delegates.” 
PCWCR. 
Comment: concession 
papuanewguinea1995.html 
Ghana, 2001 “Rawlings stepped down from the presidency in early 2001 and 
was succeeded by John Agyekum Kufuor of the New Patriotic 
Party (NPP) in the first peaceful transfer of power between 
democratically elected governments since Ghanaian 
independence in 1957.” Britannica 
Comment: President stepping down is a concession. 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 
/232376/Ghana/76830/Independence 
 
Ghana, 1996 See below under Ghana 1991. 
Comment: Re-election 
2  
Ghana, 1991 “Initially, older Ghanaians doubted that Rawlings and his 
colleagues could provide more effective and less self-interested 
government than the old politicians or generals, while other 
young soldiers thought that they could themselves engineer 
coups to secure the fruits of power. But Rawlings easily snuffed 
out two countercoups in 1982 and 1983, and it was apparent 
that there was wide and genuine approval of his purpose of 
reforming Ghana’s political and economic life. This continued 
even when he decided that there was no alternative but to 
follow conservative economic policies—such as dropping 
subsidies and price controls in order to reduce inflation, 
privatizing many state-owned companies, and devaluing 
currency in order to stimulate exports—that would secure 
International Monetary Fund support and other foreign aid. 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 
/232376/Ghana/76830/Independence 
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These free-market measures revived Ghana’s economy, which 
by the early 1990s had one of the highest growth rates in 
Africa. 
 
In 1992, in the first presidential balloting held in Ghana since 
1979, Rawlings—representing a new party, the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC)—was elected president. He was 
reelected to a second term in 1996 with almost three-fifths of 
the vote. Despite the economic progress that had been made 
during Rawlings’s rule, much of the Ghanaian press and many 
Ghanaian professionals remained highly critical of his economic 
policies and authoritarian political style.” Britannica 
 
“Finally, in the early 1990s, Ghana began to experience many of 
the same political pressures for a return to democracy that are 
affecting other African countries. In August 1991, the 
government announced a program that projected a return to 
complete civilian rule in the last quarter of 1992. Given that 
Ghana has sustained a reform program for so long, this book 
will be able to explore the relationship between political 
liberalization and economic reform that is a critical question in 
so many African countries. Indeed, this book will argue that the 
Rawlings government decided to begin the transition to 
democracy partially in response to the problems it encountered 
in its attempt to reform fundamental economic institutions.”  
Herbst (1993). 
Comment: concession. 
Gabon, 1990 “In the mid-1980s, declining petroleum prices caused an 
economic downturn. Austerity measures imposed by the 
government led to antigovernment demonstrations in Libreville 
and Port-Gentil in early 1990. This unrest led to the creation in 
March of a national conference, which included opposition 
groups, to discuss political reform. As a result, constitutional 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/223148/Gabon/40751/Gabon-since-independence 
amendments adopted in May restored the multiparty system. 
That same month the death of an opposition leader under 
mysterious circumstances sparked violent disorders that led to 
French military intervention at Port-Gentil to protect French 
nationals and their property. Order was restored, and 
implementation of the plans for political reform continued. 
Legislative elections were held in the fall, and, although 
opposition parties won seats in the new legislative assembly, 
electoral irregularities allowed the PDG to retain a small 
majority. The following year a new constitution was 
promulgated in March.” Britannica 
Comment: concession 
Djibouti, 1999 “In 1999 Gouled announced that he would not stand in the 
presidential election scheduled for April, and the RPP 
nominated Ismail Omar Guelleh, a former cabinet secretary and 
Gouled’s nephew, as its candidate. Guelleh easily beat his 
opponent, Moussa Ahmed Idriss, who represented a small 
coalition of opposition parties. In 2001 the long-serving prime 
minister Hamadou resigned for health reasons, and Guelleh 
named Dileita Muhammad Dileita, an accomplished public 
servant, to the post. Dileita, like his predecessor, was an Afar, 
and Guelleh’s appointment of him to the post maintained the 
balance of power between the Afars and Somali Issas that 
Gouled had established after independence.” Britannica 
Comment: concession. 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 
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Congo, Rep. 
1997 
Comment: Anti-democratic 3 Britannica 
 
Congo, Rep. 
1991 
“In 1991 a new constitution was drafted, and it was adopted by 
referendum in March 1992. Pascal Lissouba defeated Bernard 
Kolélas and Sassou-Nguesso and acceded to the presidency 
following elections that August. A period of shaky 
parliamentary government ensued. Competing politicians built 
followings by politicizing ethnic differences and sponsoring 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/132321/Republic-
of-the-Congo/40726/Congo-since-independence 
militias such as the Cocoye, Cobra, and Ninja groups (aligned 
with Lissouba, Sassou-Nguesso, and Kolélas, respectively), 
which led to civil conflict in 1994 and 1997. With the support of 
France and Angola—whose government was troubled by 
Lissouba’s support for the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência 
Total de Angola; UNITA) and other rebels fighting for the 
independence of the exclave of Cabinda—Sassou-Nguesso led a 
successful insurrection against the government in 1997 and 
reclaimed the presidency late in the year. However, violence 
spiraled beyond the control of the leaders who instigated it. A 
devastating civil war raged for the next two years, in which 
forces loyal to Kolélas and to the ousted Lissouba—both of 
whom had since left the country—battled government troops 
for control. A truce was signed between the warring parties in 
late 1999 in an attempt to reopen a national dialogue.” 
Britannica 
Comment: concession. 
Cameroon, 
1992 
“At first Biya had sought the development of a more 
democratic society. Competitive elections for party offices and 
the National Assembly were permitted, even though the 
country was still a single-party state. The conflict with Ahidjo 
and the 1984 coup attempt, however, brought back some of 
the restrictions of the Ahidjo era. As the sole candidate for the 
country’s only legal political party, Biya won uncontested 
presidential elections in both 1984 and 1988. In the 1990s Biya 
resisted both domestic and international pressure to 
democratize. Although he supported legislation in late 1990 
that provided for a change to a multiparty political system, he 
employed a variety of tactics to ensure the status of the RDPC 
as the dominant party.” Britannica 
Comment: concession 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic  
/90925/Cameroon/281022/Consolidation-and-challenge 
Cote D’Ivoire, “The PDCI and Bédié were victorious again in the 1995 2 Britannica 
1999 elections that were boycotted by most of the opposition. Long-
standing ethnic and religious tensions continued to exist, 
exemplified by the government’s attempt to rewrite the 
constitution to prevent certain challengers from running for 
president. With tensions escalating, soldiers mutinied on Dec. 
23, 1999, and Brig. Gen. Robert Gueï, a former member of 
Houphouët-Boigny’s government, took control of the country 
the next day. Although he pledged that he would allow 
legislative and presidential elections by October 2000 and that 
he would not be a candidate, he changed his mind and ran for 
president. After a controversial election in which Gueï tried to 
manipulate the outcome, Gbagbo of the FPI was eventually 
installed as president.” Britannica 
Comment: coup with some elections following. 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/139651/Cote-
dIvoire/278555/Political-unrest 
Central African 
Republic, 2003 
“The government continued to be plagued by protests over its 
continuing inability to pay civil servants and the military at the 
beginning of the new millennium. Attempted military 
overthrows that troubled the country in the mid-1990s also 
continued into the 21st century, culminating in the ouster of 
Patassé in a 2003 coup by former army chief Gen. Franƈois 
Bozizé. Bozizé’s transitional government oversaw the drafting 
of a new constitution that was approved in late 2004 and 
democratic elections in 2005, in which Bozizé was elected 
president.” Britannica 
Comment: anti-democratic. 
3 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102152/Central-
African-Republic/254026/The-21st-century 
Central African 
Republic, 1991 
“By the early 1990s Central Africa had become increasingly 
intolerant of Kolingba’s authoritarian control and his lavish 
lifestyle. Growing democratic movements elsewhere in Africa 
had gained strength and inspired Central Africans to take 
action. Riots broke out in 1991, after civil servants had not 
been paid in more than eight months. It took two more years 
for Kolingba to give in to demands for open elections, when he 
allowed other parties to form and slate their own candidates 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102152/Central-
African-Republic/214029/Authoritarian-rule-under-Kolingba 
for the presidency. Although he ran for president, Kolingba was 
rejected by the voters during the first round of balloting. 
Instead, Ange-Félix Patassé, a former prime minister, became 
the first democratically elected president since independence 
as the leader of the Central African People’s Liberation 
Movement (Mouvement pour la Libération du Peuple 
Centrafricain; MLPC).” Britannica 
Comment: concession. 
Burkina Faso, 
2000 
“Compaoré was reelected in 1998, 2005, and 2010. His regime, 
however, was not without opposition or controversy. 
Unpopular political and economic developments and the 
suspicious death in 1998 of Norbert Zongo, a prominent 
journalist known for speaking out against Compaoré’s 
administration, contributed to periodic episodes of social and 
political unrest that continued into the 2000s. In October 2003 
several people were arrested and accused of planning a coup to 
oust Compaoré. Meanwhile, economic troubles were 
exacerbated by the civil war that had begun in neighbouring 
Côte d’Ivoire in 2002.” Britannica 
 
“With French help, Blaise Compaoré seized power in a coup 
d'état in 1987. He overthrew his long-time friend and ally 
Thomas Sankara, who was killed in the coup. 
The constitution of 2 June 1991 established a semi-presidential 
government: its parliament can be dissolved by the President 
of the Republic, who is elected for a term of seven years. In 
2000, the constitution was amended to reduce the presidential 
term to five years and set term limits to two, preventing 
successive re-election . The amendment took effect during the 
2005 elections. If passed beforehand, it would have prevented 
the incumbent president, Blaise Compaoré, from being 
reelected. 
Other presidential candidates challenged the election results. 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 
Wikipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burkina_Faso 
 
But, in October 2005, the constitutional council ruled that, 
because Compaoré was the sitting president in 2000, the 
amendment would not apply to him until the end of his second 
term in office. This cleared the way for his candidacy in the 
2005 election. On 13 November, Compaoré was reelected in a 
landslide, because of a divided political opposition.” Wikipedia 
Comment: The constitutional amendment in 2000 was a 
concession that limited the power of the incumbent to some 
extent. 
Benin, 1990 “The late 1980s and early 1990s were a turbulent period for 
Benin. In 1989 Kérékou proclaimed that Marxism-Leninism 
would no longer be the state ideology, and there followed a 
period of transition in the direction of greater democratization, 
including the promulgation of a new constitution in 1990 and 
the liberalization of the economy. The first multiparty elections 
were held in 1991, and Kérékou was defeated by Nicéphore 
Soglo, a former cabinet member.” Britannica 
Comment: concession. 
1 Britannica 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic 
/60879/Benin/55091/Decolonization-and-independence 
 
 
